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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION THEORY
AND CAMPUS EMPLOYEE COMPUTER MISUSE
by
M. JULIANE SANTIAGO
(Under the Direction of Teri Denlea Melton)
ABSTRACT

Computer misuse is a leading problem for all industry sectors, including higher
education. However, much of the current research related to computer misuse has been
conducted in the business sector, leaving higher education a relatively unstudied group.
Many theories have been addressed in computer security literature, but only one theory
offers a more holistic solution to combating computer misuse, Situational Crime
Prevention Theory. Situational Crime Prevention Theory encompasses four categories of
countermeasures: countermeasures that Increase the Perceived Effort of the offender,
countermeasures that Increase the Perceived Risk of the offender, countermeasures that
Reduce the Anticipated Rewards of the offender, and countermeasures that Remove the
Excuses to offend. This study endeavored to investigate whether a relationship exists
between the categories of countermeasures found in Situational Crime Prevention and the
actual number of computer misuse incidents reported by CIO’s of public, four-year
colleges and universities. Using a web-accessible, anonymous questionnaire, CIO’s of
442 public, four-year colleges and universities were asked to provide information related
to the countermeasures that they have in place at their institutions and the number of
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insider computer misuse incidents their institutions experienced in the year 2009. The
data were analyzed with PLS-Graph software to include composite reliability, t statistic
and critical value analysis, and R-square analysis. Results showed a significant
relationship between two out of four categories of countermeasures and the actual
number of computer misuse incidents. These results would be particularly useful to
administrators in higher education who are responsible for designing a technology
security plan that is focused and cost-effective.

INDEX WORDS: Computer misuse, Higher education, Situational crime prevention
theory
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In September of 2008, hackers accessed an inner computer system of one of the
most expensive pieces of experimental machinery in history. With a price tag of over $8
billion, the Large Hadron Collider was designed to reveal the secrets of dark matter, antimatter, and possibly even hidden dimensions of space and time. But, armed only with a
keyboard, individuals calling themselves Group 2600 of the Greek Security Team were
stopped just short of acquiring complete control of one of the key subsystems for the
Collider (Keim, 2008). This type of infrequent, high-profile type of computer misuse
captures the attention of the public, but computer misuse happens everyday, in thousands
of companies worldwide.
In his landmark study of computer misuse, Straub (1990) defined computer
misuse as “unauthorized and deliberate misuse of assets of the local organizational
information system by individuals” (p. 257). Examples of misuse might include
unauthorized network access, tampering with or stealing sensitive data, abusing e-mail
privileges, or installing unlicensed software. It is important to note that computer misuse
can be divided into two categories: misuse committed by an outsider; and, misuse
committed by an insider. Though outsiders, or “hackers” receive the most press
attention, it is insider misuse that costs companies in terms of lost revenue, productivity,
and image (Computer Crime and Security Survey, 2008; Department for Business
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2007). Insider computer misuse can be further
divided into two categories: misuse that is unintentional in nature and stems from a lack
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of understanding about current policies and procedures; and, misuse that is intentional in
nature (Kesar & Rogerson, 1998). Therefore, insider computer misuse can be committed
through acts of software piracy, theft or destruction of sensitive data, release of malicious
software, and misuse of email and/or Internet services.
Insider computer misuse is not confined to the business sector. College and
university campuses also experience this type of computer misuse. In the 2006 survey of
information technology (IT) security in higher education, Kvavik and Voloudakis (2006),
working with the Educause Center for Applied Research (ECAR), found that 26% of
responding campuses reported compromise of confidential information, and 12.5%
reported damage to data. It should be noted that ECAR does not differentiate between
insider and outsider computer misuse in their findings, but they do report that
Baccalaureate and Associate’s institutions are more concerned with unlicensed use of
digital products and employees’ misuse of computers, respectively. Further, in their
study of college students, Cronan, Foltz, and Jones (2006) found that 34% of responding
students admitted to software misuse or piracy, and 22% admitted to committing data
misuse.
Additionally, campus administrators are faced with implementing an effective
security plan within the confines of a relatively small IT security budget. Therefore, a
well-targeted, cost-efficient and effective security plan is at the forefront of the battle
against insider computer misuse on college campuses. Situational Crime Prevention, a
theory from criminology, offers several factors that have the potential to assist
administrators in creating an effective security plan. However, little, if any, research
exists to establish the relationship of Situational Crime Prevention to the IT security field.
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Many researchers have outlined various countermeasures to help combat insider
computer misuse (Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Harrington, 1996; Kesar &
Rogerson, 1998). These countermeasures can be divided into two broad categories:
technical controls, such as passwords and firewalls; and, formal or management-type
controls, such as codes of ethics and acceptable use policies. Researchers agree that the
most effective security plan includes elements from both categories of countermeasures
(Dhillon & Moores , 2001; Straub, 1990; Willison & Backhouse, 2006).
An examination of computer security literature reveals three theories, all
originating from the field of criminology, that have captured the attention of researchers:
General Deterrence Theory, Rational Choice Theory and Situational Crime Prevention.
While these three theories share some commonalities in their basic assumptions, there are
significant differences in their focus.
The foundation of General Deterrence Theory is the assumption that punishment
should be “certain, swift and proportionately severe” (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001, p.
14). The general assumption behind the theory is that people tend to use cost/benefit
analysis when making any important decision, whether that decision is related to their
career, a major purchase, or even a criminal act. This cost/benefit analysis may include
factors such as the ease of committing a crime, the likelihood of getting caught, and the
potential rewards of success. Unlike other theories in criminology, this theory
specifically supports the belief that an appropriately harsh punishment that is sure to
follow a crime will tilt the scales more toward the cost end of the spectrum, in effect,
deterring an individual from committing a crime (Paternoster & Bachman).
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While General Deterrence Theory focuses on factors that may deter someone
from committing a crime due to the fear of punishment, the Rational Choice Theory
focuses on decisions that criminals make during the commission of a crime (Cornish &
Clarke, 1986). The assumption of Rational Choice Theory is the idea that people make
the decision to commit a crime much like they make a decision in other mundane tasks,
such as buying a television or a car, a process described by the expected utility model
(Paternoster & Bachman, 2001). They weigh the costs and benefits of a given action and
then make a decision. It is through the study of criminals’ decision-making process that
researchers can devise ways to make crime more costly to the criminal, thereby
preventing criminal behavior by tilting the costs to outweigh the benefits of the criminal
act.
Finally, Situational Crime Prevention Theory shares a theoretical underpinning
with Rational Choice Theory, in that both theories do not try to explain the criminal, only
the criminal act itself (Clarke, 1997). Situational Crime Prevention Theory attempts to
prevent crime by altering various situational factors that influence a criminal’s decision to
commit a crime. The theory does not address the detection or sanctioning of offenders,
nor does it address the reduction of criminal tendencies through social means; its goal is
to make a criminal act less appealing to offenders.
Clarke (1997) outlined 16 “opportunity-reducing” techniques in his original
Situational Crime Prevention Theory. These 16 techniques are grouped into four
categories (Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated
Reward, and Remove Excuses) which impact a criminal’s decision to commit a crime
through either increasing the cost or reducing the benefit, or removing the justification for

18
commission.
Beebe and Rao (2005) took Clark’s (1997) original crime opportunity-reducing
techniques and applied them to the field of computer security, creating a comprehensive
and more holistic set of countermeasures that consist of both technical and formal,
management-type controls. Table 1 aligns Clarke’s original 16 opportunity reducing
technique with a typical traditional crime countermeasure and a corresponding computer
misuse countermeasure (Beebe & Rao).
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Table 1

Remove Excuses

Decrease Anticipated
Rewards

Increase
Perceived Risk

Increase
Perceived Effort

Situational Crime Prevention Techniques as Applied to Traditional Crime and Computer
Misuse
Technique
Traditional Crime
Computer Misuse
Countermeasure
Countermeasure
1. Target hardening
Locks, safes, fences,
Firewalls, closed ports,
armed guards
vulnerability patches
2. Access control
Gate codes, guard shack,
ID/authentication systems,
receptionist, swipe cards
digital certificates
3. Deflecting
Pedestrian/auto traffic
Honeypots/honeynets,
offenders
redirection, no loitering
information segregation
4. Controlling
Gun control, limit ability
Masking IP addresses,
facilitators
to communicate
leased lines, no broadcast
5. Entry/exit
Metal detectors, screeners, Intrusion detection system,
screenings
merchandise tagging
virus scanning
6. Formal
CCTV, security guards,
Auditing and log reviews,
surveillance
police patrols
anomaly detection
7. Surveillance by
Responsibility and/or
Resource usage info, user
employees
ability to monitor
training, reporting policies
8. Natural
Lights, etc. so passers-by
Tamper-proof network
surveillance
can see activity in the
cabling, visualization tools
building
9. Target removal
Electronic donations vs.
Information and hardware
cash, cash diverted to safe segregation, DMZ’s
10. Identifying
VIN etched into auto
Information classification,
property
glass, write name in book watermarking
11. Reducing
Obscure valuables, gender Minimize reconnaissance
temptation
neutral phonebook
info, no port bannering
12. Denying benefits Security coded car radios, Encryption, automatic data
ink tags on clothing
destruction mechanisms
13. Rule
Acceptable use policy,
Acceptable use policy, user
setting/clarification
clear laws, licensing
agreements, clear laws
procedures
14. Stimulating
“Shoplifting is stealing”
Multi-level warning
conscience
signs, “current speed is”
banners, codes of ethics
15. Controlling
Controlling drugs/alcohol, Cyber-ethics education,
disinhibitors
propaganda, violent TV
supervised computer use
16. Facilitating
“Graffiti boards”, public
“Hacker challenges,”
compliance
urinals, shelters, barriers
employment opportunities
(adapted from Beebe & Rao, 2005)
Situational Crime Prevention has proven successful in reducing crime in many
types of situations including aircraft hijackings, post office robberies, and bank robberies
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(Clarke, 1997; Ekblom, 1988; Gabor, 1990; Grandjean, 1990; Wilkinson, 1986). Its
effectiveness in the field of computer security, however, has yet to be established, though
the potential for success in reducing computer misuse is very promising. The theory’s
straightforward focus on situational factors that can prevent criminal behavior and, in a
computer security setting, its holistic approach to technical and formal, management-type
controls, offers an adaptable security plan that may be used to reduce insider computer
misuse in many situations.
Implementation of any type of IT security in higher education is challenging.
There is a constant struggle between an IT security specialist’s need to implement a
strong security plan and academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration
(Oblinger, 2003). Therefore, a higher education campus offers a unique setting to explore
the relationship between Situational Crime Prevention and insider computer misuse, such
as software piracy and inappropriate email and/or Internet usage. Additionally, much of
the prior research on misuse countermeasures has focused on insider computer misuse in
the business environment, leaving college campus employees a relatively unstudied
group.
Statement of the Problem
Computer misuse is a leading problem for all industry sectors, including colleges
and universities. Though many researchers have proposed different countermeasures to
combat the problem, there is no clear solution. It could be argued that many of the
countermeasures found in the literature are too one-sided; some countermeasures focus
completely on technical countermeasures, such as passwords and firewalls, to the
exclusion of administrative controls, such as a clearly stated Acceptable Use Policy, or
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vice versa. A combination of the two types of countermeasures might prove to be the
most effective solution.
Situational Crime Prevention Theory outlines a number of technical and
administrative countermeasures to prevent insider computer misuse. When applied to the
field of information technology, a more holistic approach to preventing insider computer
misuse emerges. However, to date, there is no study in either the business environment or
higher education environment regarding the relationship between Situational Crime
Prevention and insider computer misuse.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between the categories
of countermeasures in Situational Crime Prevention Theory and the number of insider
computer misuse incidents on college campuses.
College and university campuses are not immune to computer misuse incidents.
Often, their information technology security budgets are smaller than most business
budgets, necessitating use of the most effective security countermeasures. The researcher
explored the above relationships as an effort to help campus IT departments choose the
most efficient and effective security countermeasures. From this data, the researcher
responded to the following research questions.
Research Questions
R1 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived effort to commit
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on
campus?

22
R2 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived risk of
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse
incidents on campus?
R3 – To what extent are the countermeasures that decrease the anticipated reward for
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse
incidents on campus?
R4 – To what extent are the countermeasures that remove the excuses for committing
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on
campus?
R5 – What are the respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived
effectiveness?
Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework model, including independent and
dependent constructs, and labeled research questions.
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Situational Crime Prevention
Categories of Countermeasures

Increase
Perceived
Effort

Increase
Perceived
Risk

Decrease
Anticipated
Reward

R1

R2

Insider
computer
misuse
incidents in
higher
education
institutions

R3

R4

Increase
Perceived
Effort

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework with Labeled Research Questions
Significance of the Study
The number of reported computer misuse incidents continues to be unacceptably
high in industry surveys, both in the United States and the United Kingdom (Computer

24
Crime and Security Survey, 2008; Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform, 2007). Losses from computer misuse incidents can be categorized as monetary
losses, often as much as hundreds of thousands of dollars, productivity losses, and
damage to an institution’s reputation if sensitive information is leaked. Despite the
pervasive reports of security-related and computer misuse incidents, no one method or
combination of methods, has proven consistently effective in preventing these incidents
of misuse (Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Harrington, 1996; Kesar &
Rogerson, 1998; Straub, 1990). Additionally, most published research related to the
prevention of computer misuse has concentrated on the business sector, not colleges and
universities.
It was posited that the current research would provide empirical evidence for
Situational Crime Prevention’s application in the field of computer security within higher
education. The data may yield the identification of effective countermeasures, thereby
providing a roadmap for institutions seeking an effective plan for preventing computer
misuse. An effective, well-targeted security plan should reduce the costs associated with
incidents of computer misuse and the costs of plan implementation. While this reduction
in cost should benefit all business sectors, it should be especially important to colleges
and universities whose resources may be more limited.
In addition to the implications for reducing cost, data from the current research
have implications for leaders in higher education in terms of security policy. Educational
leaders in the area of IT security face an unprecedented amount of pressure to ensure the
confidentiality of personal data and offer an extremely high level of system availability.
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While an effective security plan will support both of these requirements, it is security
policy that will ultimately drive the security plan.
Procedures
This correlational study was conducted using a quantitative approach. The target
population was public four-year colleges and universities throughout the United States.
Respondents were the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or an administrator of equivalent
responsibility at each institution. Because of the large target population and the sensitive
nature of reporting computer security and computer misuse information, an anonymous,
web-accessible questionnaire was deemed the best method to collect data.
The researcher-developed instrument included questions related to the security
measures in place at each college or university and the number of known insider
computer misuse incidents in the last year. Additionally, data were collected regarding
the CIO’s top five countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness. Following IRB
approval, a pilot test involving eight colleges and/or universities was performed to ensure
face validity and that the questionnaire wording and definitions were clear to the
respondents. The questionnaire was edited and invitations were sent to 442 CIO’s.
Resulting questionnaire data were analyzed using PLS Graph software. PLS Graph
utilizes structural equation modeling using a partial least squares approach. Because PLS
Graph places minimal demands on criteria such as sample size, it is an appropriate choice
for theory confirmation in exploratory studies (Chin, 1998). Incomplete questionnaires
were discarded.
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Limitations and Delimitations
The researcher identified the following limitations of the study. Due to the
sensitive nature of computer security incidents, respondents may be reluctant to share that
information, and/or to be open and honest. However, the anonymity of the administration
of the instrument helped to mitigate this limitation. Additionally, the questionnaire
instrument was researcher-developed, and the researcher is making the assumption that
the instrument measures what it proposes to measure. To lessen the effects of this
limitation, a pilot test was performed to ensure face validity, and discriminant validity
was completed. A final limitation was the use of categories to summarize the reported
computer misuse incidents. To date, there is no set standard for the categorization of
computer misuse incidents.
The study was delimited to include all public four-year institutions of higher
education within the United States. Of 653 public four-year institutions, the researcher
identified 442 CIO contact names and emails.
Definition of Key Terms
Computer misuse - Based on Straub’s (1990) definition, this study defines computer
misuse as the unauthorized and deliberate misuse of an organization’s computer
resources, including: hardware (computers, servers, storage devices and
peripheral devices); software (theft and/or illegal copying); data (theft and/or
modification or destruction of data); and, service (use of email or Internet access
for non-work related activities). For the purposes of this study, computer misuse
will be measured by the number of incidents in the last 12 months that each CIO
reports on the survey.
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Countermeasures – Based upon definitions found in the literature, countermeasures are
the broad groups of controls that are utilized to guard against computer misuse
(Backhouse & Dhillon, 1995; Dhillon & Moores, 2001; Dhillon, Silva, &
Backhouse, 2004; Hoffer & Straub, 1994).
Insider - For the purposes of this study, an insider is a current or former employee of a
college or university.
Insider computer misuse – For the purposes of this study, insider computer misuse is
misuse of computer resources by a current or former employee of a college or
university.
Public four-year college/university – For the purposes of this study, a public four-year
college/university is an institution of higher education that is supported primarily
by public funds and offers programs of at least four years duration or one that
offers programs at or above the baccalaureate level.
Chapter Summary
Though high-profile computer security misuse, such as the attack on the Large
Hadron Collider, is relatively infrequent, computer misuse committed by insiders is an
ongoing problem that occurs every day and in every industry. Computer misuse is not
simply a nuisance for administrators; consequences of insider computer misuse can range
from damage to a company’s reputation to considerable financial losses. Colleges and
universities can be particularly vulnerable to these incidents because their IT security
budgets may be smaller than most business’ budgets and can, therefore, implement only
the most cost-efficient and effective security countermeasures.
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Situational Crime Prevention, a theory originating in criminology, outlines a
number of technical and administrative countermeasures to prevent crime. When applied
to the field of computer security, a more holistic and potentially effective approach to
preventing insider computer misuse emerges. Situational Crime Prevention’s relationship
to insider computer misuse, however, has yet to be empirically explored.
Therefore, the purpose of this correlational study was to explore the relationship
between the categories of countermeasures inherent in Situational Crime Prevention
Theory and the number of known computer misuse incidents on college campuses. The
researcher-developed instrument included questions related to the countermeasures in
place at each college or university, the CIO’s top five countermeasures in terms of
perceived effectiveness, and the number of known insider computer misuse incidents in
the year 2009.
A pilot test of eight colleges and/or universities was performed to ensure face
validity and that the instrument questions were worded clearly. The target population
was current CIO’s or administrators of equivalent position within public four-year
institutions of higher education in the United States. The questionnaire was made
electronically available via the web. Data analysis was completed using PLS Graph. It
was posited that the study has implication for higher education institutions in the creation
of appropriate security policy to drive the most effective and cost-efficient security plan
possible.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
The infiltration of an inner computer system of the Large Hadron Collider, an $8
billion piece of experimental machinery, captured worldwide attention in September of
2008. Armed only with a keyboard, individuals calling themselves Group 2600 of the
Greek Security Team were stopped just short of acquiring complete control of one of the
key subsystems for the Collider (Keim, 2008). This type of infrequent, high-profile
exploit captures the attention of the public, but computer misuse happens everyday, in
thousands of companies worldwide.
As this study sought to explore the issue of insider computer misuse within higher
education, it is important to study computer misuse as a general area of research in the
field of information technology and then frame the topic within higher education. Though
higher education institutions face many of the same issues as business institutions, the
topic of culture within higher education becomes an important issue, even within the field
of computer misuse. Finally, an examination of three criminological theories often
applied to computer misuse was presented.
Computer Misuse as a Pervasive Problem
In his landmark study of computer misuse, Straub (1990) defined computer
misuse as “unauthorized and deliberate misuse of assets of the local organizational
information system by individuals” (p. 257). Examples of misuse might include
unauthorized network access, tampering with or stealing sensitive data, abusing e-mail
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privileges, or installing unlicensed software. Though the field of information security has
made progress in combating misuse, statistics show that the problem has not been
curtailed and, in many cases, is still increasing. The Computer Security Institute
distributed its Computer Crime and Security Survey (2008) to over five thousand
computer security professionals in corporations, government agencies, financial
institutions, medical facilities, and universities in the United States. Findings indicated
that the average annual loss related to each incident of computer misuse was close to
$300,000. Forty-three percent of respondents reported at least one security-related
incident in the year 2008. Of these 43%, 49% of companies experienced a virus incident,
and 46% of companies reported at least one incident of insider network misuse.
The Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2007) in the
United Kingdom performed a security survey very similar to the Computer Security
Institute. The methodology consisted of a structured questionnaire given by telephone
survey to the person responsible for information security at randomly chosen businesses
in the United Kingdom. The Department also considered the fact that the majority of
businesses in the United Kingdom tend to be small in size. In order to provide equal
representation for large size businesses, the Department chose to boost the sample for this
group and weight the results. In total, 1,007 interviews were completed. The percentage
of companies that reported a serious security-related incident in 2006 was 45% for small
companies (less than 50 employees), 72% for large companies (greater than 250
employees), and 96% for very large companies (greater than 500 employees).
These incidence figures from the United States and United Kingdom are
significant in two ways. First, the reported figures may be underrepresented because
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many companies choose not to report computer misuse incidents due to the possibility of
negative publicity (Hoffer & Straub, 1994). Second, the figures from the United
Kingdom show a marked increase in security-related incidents in relation to company
size. It could be that the larger companies pose a more lucrative target for a hacker, or
outsider, seeking access to sensitive or financial data. More likely, however, it is the
employee, or insider, that is committing the computer misuse. The Computer Security
Institute’s 2007 survey showed that insider misuse accounted for 59% of security
incidents, and the Institute’s 2008 survey showed that insider misuse accounted for 44%
of security incidents.
Computer misuse can be divided into two categories: misuse committed by an
outsider and misuse committed by an insider. Though the outside “hacking” incidents
receive the most press attention, insider computer misuse accounts for a significant
percentage of losses experienced each year. Statistics from both the Computer Security
Institute’s 2008 survey and the United Kingdom’s Department for Business Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform’s 2007 survey support this assertion. While the most prevalent
problem reported was virus infiltration, the second-most most prevalent security problem
reported by the Computer Security Institute’s survey was insider misuse, including e-mail
misuse, trafficking pornography or pirated software, and unauthorized network access.
The United Kingdom survey reported that 47% of large companies suffered some type of
employee misuse of computer resources, with misuse of web access and email reported
the most often.
Further, Fortiva, Inc. (2005) reported that 68% of U.S. employees who normally
use email at work have sent or received at least one inappropriate email using their work
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account. Though most people do not think that sending or receiving inappropriate email
can have serious consequences for a company, Chevron Corporation was ordered to pay
over $2 million to female employees in settlement of a sexual harassment lawsuit that
originated with an inappropriate email that was circulated by male employees (Verespej,
2000).
The evidence shows that insider computer misuse is a problem. The next question
becomes how to combat it.
Discussion of Countermeasures
Insider computer misuse is not a new phenomenon, and numerous studies have
addressed the problem and discussed recommended countermeasures. When examined
holistically, the countermeasures fall into two overall categories: technical controls and
administrative controls.
Technical Countermeasures
Technical countermeasures are those controls which often are technology-based.
The most common countermeasures found in the literature include authentication for
resource access, monitoring software, and data access control using security levels
(Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Panko & Beh, 2002; Straub, 1990;
Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002). Authentication involves the appropriate use of a username
and password combination in order to control access to a network or data. Monitoring
software could be in the form of email filtering and monitoring for offensive words, or
Internet surfing monitoring to ensure that employees do not access or download offensive
material. Data access control involves classifying data according to its sensitivity and
then assigning rights to those employees who can access it.
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Data from the Computer Security Institute’s 2008 survey supports the presence of
these common technical controls. Following are some of the most common types of
technical countermeasures to deter computer misuse followed by the percentage of
companies that utilized them: account login and password: 46%; log management
software: 51%; web monitoring software: 49%; and, email monitoring software: 49%.
Table 2 below outlines some of the most common technical countermeasures to combat
insider computer misuse with a corresponding reference in the literature. It should be
noted, however, that the reference list is not meant to be exhaustive as the most common
countermeasures are mentioned countless times in computer security literature.
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Table 2
Common Technical Countermeasures with Corresponding Reference
Countermeasure
Firewalls

Physical security
Authentication*
Kerberos*
Access control lists*
Proxy servers*
Virus scanning
Login/logout rules and procedures*
Email monitoring software*
Web usage monitoring software*
Database partitioning and use of data
views*
Data sensitivity classification
Auditing and log reviews
Review of resource information
Cameras in data sensitive areas and/or
video surveillance*
Automatic data destruction
Virtual Private Networks*

Encryption

Network packet shaping*
Controlled distribution of software*
Screen saver lock*
* countermeasure added by researcher

Reference
Beebe & Rao, 2005; Computer Security
Institute, 2008; Johnson & Ugray, 2007;
Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006; Pfleeger &
Pfleeger, 2007
Beebe & Rao, 2005; Pfleeger & Pfleeger,
2007; Straub & Welke, 1998
Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006; Pfleeger &
Pfleeger, 2007; Straub & Welke, 1998
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007
Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan & Wei, 2003;
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007
Beebe & Rao, 2005; Computer Security
Institute, 2008; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007
Johnson & Ugray, 2007; Phyo & Furnell,
2004
Johnston & Ugray, 2007; Phyo & Furnell,
2004
Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan & Wei, 2003;
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007
Beebe & Rao, 2005
Beebe & Rao, 2005; Kvavik &
Voloudakis, 2006; Phyo & Furnell, 2004
Beebe & Rao, 2005
Booker & Kitchens, 2010; Hu, Tan, Wang
& Maybank, 2004
Beebe & Rao, 2005
Computer Security Institute, 2007; Kvavik
& Voloudakis, 2006; Pfleeger & Pfleeger,
2007
Computer Security Institute, 2007; Beebe
& Rao, 2005; Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006;
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007
Phyo & Furnell, 2004
Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006
USDA security policies, n.d.
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Though no one can refute the importance of technical security controls, many
authors reflect upon the propensity of some companies to rely solely on these technical
countermeasures (Osborne, 1998; Parker, 1997; von Solms, 2001). With a complete
emphasis on technical controls, the problem of computer misuse becomes very one-sided,
and the holistic nature of computer security is lost. The other side of the security coin is
the presence of administrative controls, such as codes of ethics and employee security
awareness training.
Administrative Countermeasures
Administrative countermeasures are not necessarily based on technology; they are
rooted more in policy, ethics, and training. The field of ethics is an integral part of the
study of insider computer misuse, and many companies put their faith into codes of ethics
and acceptable use policies. These companies might also participate in employee
security training. The Computer Security Institute’s 2008 survey found that 82% of
companies provide some type of awareness training for their employees. The United
Kingdom’s Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform’s 2007 survey
shows that 55% of companies surveyed have a documented security policy, and 40%
provide employee security training. It also appears that 86% of large businesses surveyed
provided an acceptable use policy to their employees. However, there is controversy
over the effectiveness of acceptable use policies and codes of ethics without the presence
of technical controls. Harrington (1996) did not find a uniform relationship between
codes of ethics and computer misuse judgments and intentions of information systems
employees. It appeared that, overall, the presence of a code of ethics did not greatly
impact employees intentions to commit misuse. Similarly, von der Embse, Desai, and
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Desai (2004) found that ethical codes and policies simply do not effectively guide ethical
behavior. Table 3 shows some of the more common administrative or formal
countermeasures with corresponding references in the literature. Like the technical
countermeasures described previously, many countermeasures are mentioned in countless
articles and textbooks. Therefore, the reference list provided here is not meant to be
exhaustive.
Table 3
Common Administrative Countermeasures with Corresponding Reference
Countermeasure
Presence of and dissemination of Codes of
Ethics, Acceptable Use Policies, User
Agreements, Misuse Reporting Policies,
and/or Internet Use Policies
Supervised computer use
Cyber-ethics education
Clearly defined job duties and/or rules*
Password policies*
Required training for all new users*
Offer software to employees at reduced
prices*
* countermeasure added by researcher

Reference
Beebe & Rao, 2005; D’Arcy, Hovav &
Galletta, 2009; Dhillon & Moores , 2001;
Dominguez, Ramaswamy, Martinez &
Cleal, 2010; Harrington, 1996; Johnson &
Ugray, 2007; Straub, 1990
Beebe & Rao, 2005
Beebe & Rao, 2005
Backhouse & Dhillon, 1995; Dhillon &
Moores, 2001
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007; Straub &
Welke, 1998
Straub & Welke, 1998
Chiang & Assane, 2002

Combination of Technical and Administrative Countermeasures
In order to implement the most effective security plan possible, there must be both
technical controls and administrative-type controls in place. Many institutions choose to
implement acceptable use polices or codes of ethics to enhance the effectiveness of
deterring insider computer misuse through technical controls. Straub (1990) found that,
in addition to technical controls, the process of informing users of what constitutes
unacceptable computer behavior and the corresponding penalties for said misuse in
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addition to computer awareness training sessions are effective deterrents. Similarly,
Dhillon and Moores (2001) advocated the use of technical controls, such as controlling
access to computer systems, in addition to written policies and employee security training
and education. Willison and Backhouse (2006) compared effective security to a house of
cards. Neglect in any one area will impact another area and possibly create an
opportunity for misuse; thereby, reinforcing the need for a more cohesive approach
involving both technical and policy controls.
With researchers demonstrating the effectiveness of a two-sided defense
consisting of technical controls and policies against employee computer misuse, why
does computer misuse still occur? The answer is that people, their behavior, and their
motivations are at the heart of computer security, and what works in the business
environment may be completely inappropriate and/or ineffective in higher education.
Computer Security in Higher Education
The studies and surveys mentioned so far originated within the business
environment. A search of the literature revealed only two studies related to computer
security in higher education. Kvavik and Voloudakis, through the Educause Center for
Applied Research, surveyed higher education institutions within the United States and
Canada regarding the state of computer security on their campuses (2006). Twenty-six
percent of respondents reported compromise of confidential information, and 12.5%
reported damage to data. It should be noted that Kvavik and Voloudakis do not
differentiate between insider and outsider computer misuse in their findings, but they do
report that Baccalaureate and Associate’s institutions are more concerned with unlicensed
use of digital products and employees’ misuse of computers, respectively. Further, in
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their study of college students, Cronan, Foltz, and Jones (2006) found that 34% of
responding students admitted to software misuse or piracy, and 22% admitted to
committing data misuse.
With the exception of Kvavik and Voloudakis’ 2006 study and Cronan, Foltz, and
Jones’ 2006 study, computer security in higher education has been relatively unstudied.
This could be due to the idea that effective implementation of computer security is
difficult in a higher education setting, mainly due to environment and culture.
Higher Education Culture
With its roots in the early 1800’s, the Germanic notion of academic freedom has
permeated the culture of American higher education. One definition of academic
freedom is “freedom for students to choose their own studies and freedom for professors
to study and teach what they would [choose]” (Cohen, 1998, p. 128). Wolff (1969)
probably best summed up the culture ideal of higher education institutions:
[T]he fundamental purpose of this community (the university) is the preservation
and advancement of learning and the pursuit of truth in an atmosphere of freedom
and mutual respect, in which the intellectual freedoms of teaching, expression,
research, and debate are guaranteed absolutely. (p. 131)
Though Wolff’s views are, indeed, a cultural “ideal,” the tenants of academic freedom
juxtaposed against higher education taking on a more bureaucratic and business-like
atmosphere are a reality, a trend that is expected to only increase in the future within the
topic of accountability of higher education. As long as colleges and universities receive
public funds, they will be expected to not only provide proof that specific outcomes have
been attained, but that the attainment of those outcomes have been made in the most
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efficient manner possible (Berdahl & McConnell, 1999). These demands represent the
growing influence of business and industry on higher education, with the subsequent
rules and procedures that follow. The constant battle between the ideal of academic
freedom and the growing demand for business-like operations creates an environment
that is inherently difficult for computer security professionals. Computer professionals
would prefer to not allow anyone to install software on university computers or allow no
off-campus access to the internal network, but university professors demand some type of
autonomy regarding their classrooms and how they choose to work. From an
organizational culture standpoint, this situation often creates subcultures within a college
or university campus. These subcultures then create their own set of rules and practices
that are not always in line with the larger university policy (Keup, Walker, Astin, &
Lindholm, 2001).
Change is another factor to consider in a discussion of culture in higher education.
Higher education is likely to include students from a very diverse population. This
diverse population is likely to include students and employees of differing age, ethnicity,
culture, and diverse learning needs (VanPatten, 2000). In most situations, this diversity
can only enrich a campus’ culture. But the needs of computer security are different;
computer security craves a homogeneous environment as it is easier to control. There is a
constant struggle between a computer security specialist’s need to implement a strong
security plan and academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration
(Oblinger, 2003).
A discussion of change in higher education is not complete without a discussion
of technology. The availability of technology has created learning experiences that were
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previously impossible. Consider a professor who conducts class from a classroom on a
university’s main campus but through the use of teleconferencing equipment and
software, that lecture is broadcast to multiple classrooms at satellite campuses across the
state, possibly across the globe. Students and faculty have access to untold amounts of
research on the Internet. Technology is so ubiquitous that a full discussion of its
application in higher education is beyond the scope of this research. Suffice it to say that
technology has brought about numerous opportunities in higher education but, with these
opportunities, come challenges, as well (Gumport & Chun, 1999). Challenges come in
the form of controlling the technology: providing access while limiting inappropriate
activities, providing software for learning while limiting piracy, and providing resources
for faculty and staff to do their jobs while limiting misuse of those resources.
Though higher education campuses face some unique challenges when it comes to
combating insider computer misuse, lessons can be learned by studying computer misuse
in the business world. An even richer understanding comes from studying the problem
from a criminological standpoint.
Computer Misuse from a Theoretical Perspective
Computer misuse, whether the misuse in question actually violates any laws,
appears to mimic most types of crimes. There is the intent to commit misuse, weighing
of costs and benefits, and the potential for punishment. Though most of the current
research focuses on the technologies used to combat computer misuse, in order to learn
more about the behavior of an employee who commits computer misuse, it is useful to
look at the field of criminology and examine three theories that have been applied to the
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research within computer security. These theories are: General Deterrence Theory,
Rational Choice Theory, and Situational Crime Prevention.
General Deterrence Theory
The foundation of General Deterrence Theory is the idea that punishment should
be “certain, swift and proportionately severe” (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001, p. 14). The
roots of these attributes can be traced back to the writings of Cesare Beccaria who wrote
an essay on penal reform entitled Essay on Crimes and Punishments during 18th century
Italy (1985/1764). Through his essay, Beccaria (1985) hoped to reform the current legal
system which was riddled with obscure laws, no uniform system of sentencing, and harsh
and often cruel punishments. Beccaria posed the idea that punishment for crimes should
be swift and certain, and only be harsh enough to deter someone from actually
committing a crime. It is the certainty of punishment that is far more effective than the
harshness of it. This idea appeals to human’s natural sense of rationality. People tend to
use cost/benefit analysis when making any important decision, whether that decision is
related to their career, a major purchase, or even a criminal act. The idea that an
appropriately harsh punishment is sure to follow a crime will tilt the scales more toward
the cost end of the spectrum and effectively deter an individual from committing a crime
(Paternoster & Bachman). It is this dependence upon swift, certain and appropriately
harsh punishment that can cause General Deterrence Theory to lose its effectiveness in
practice.
Empirical criminology research has shown that there is a modest relationship
between crime rates and appropriately harsh punishment (Gibbs, 1975; Nagin, 1978).
However, the evidence for a relationship between certain, observed punishment and
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crime rates proved to be a bit stronger. The reasoning for this effect is fairly
straightforward. Someone who is contemplating committing a crime must be fairly
certain that he/she will be caught in order for deterrence to work. Moreover, if a criminal
knows that a friend committed a crime and was not caught or punished, the credibility of
the deterrent nature of punishment is eroded (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001).
Other researchers in the field of criminology have expanded General Deterrence
Theory to include not only formal sanctions for committing a crime (i.e. incarceration
and/or fines) but also informal sanctions such as disapproval from friends, co-workers, or
a spouse (Anderson, Chiricos, & Waldo, 1977; Grasmick & Green, 1980; Nagin &
Paternoster, 1991; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983; Williams &
Hawkins, 1986). Expanding the definition of punishment to include any negative
consequence allows the possible application of General Deterrence Theory to many
situations, including computer misuse, as many forms of computer misuse are not illegal,
thereby eliminating the possibility of legal sanctions for their commission. Additionally,
other researchers have found that crime rates decrease with the corresponding increase of
police presence, thereby increasing the certainty that a criminal will be caught (Levitt,
1996; Marvell & Moody, 1994). If people know they are being watched, or “policed,”
they are much less likely to commit a crime.
General Deterrence Theory has often been applied in the field of computer
security. Straub (1990) outlined the need for informing users about unacceptable
computer usage and the penalties for noncompliance, along with the appropriate and
consistent enforcement of these policies. In addition to the effectiveness of outlining
acceptable use policies and corresponding penalties, Straub found that the number of
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hours per week dedicated to data security by information systems personnel, as well as
the use of software that monitors employees’ activity, had a significant impact on
employee computer misuse. This finding supports the deterrence approach of policing.
Harrington (1996) outlined the idea that codes of ethics take the place of laws
within organizations. Even without the presence of formal or informal sanctions, it is
possible that the very presence of a code of ethics and the dissemination of its contents
suggests negative consequences will occur in the event of a violation (Tittle, 1980).
Harrington’s study, however, revealed that codes of ethics are generally ineffective
deterrents for computer misuse, with information systems-specific codes only slightly
more effective at deterring sabotage. One interesting finding of this study is that codes of
ethics are effective in deterring those employees who possess a low degree of response
deniability. Response deniability involves to what degree a person takes responsibility
for his/her own actions. Therefore, someone with low response deniability generally
accepts responsibility and lives up to moral commitments.
A third study that applied a slightly modified version of General Deterrence
Theory reported results that were contrary to several previous studies (D’Arcy, Hovav, &
Galletta, 2006). The authors proposed that user awareness of security countermeasures
impacts their perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment for computer
misuse, thereby affecting information systems misuse intentions. In direct contrast to
Gibbs (1975) and Nagin (1978), this study found that perceived severity of sanctions had
a much greater influence on user intention to commit misuse than perceived certainty of
sanctions. Also, in direct contrast to Harrington (1996) is this study’s finding that the
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presence of a security policy is an effective deterrent to employee computer misuse
because these policies can increase users’ perceptions of punishment severity.
In a follow up study, D’Arcy, Hovav, and Galletta (2009) surveyed 269 computer
users in eight companies regarding user awareness of security countermeasures. They
found that three practices deter misuse: user awareness of security policies; security
education, training, and awareness programs; and, computer monitoring. Further, their
results showed that the perceived severity of sanctions was more effective in deterring
computer misuse than the certainty of sanctions.
The lack of consensus among research studies in the field of General Deterrence
Theory reveals the difficulty in finding one deterrence that applies to criminal behavior
due to the variance in personalities and behaviors that are innate within human beings.
Adding to this complexity is the fact that many people who commit computer misuse,
specifically hackers, feel they are simply pointing out a weakness to a company or that
harming a company is vastly different than harming another person (Conger, Loch, &
Helft, 1995; Hafner & Markoff, 1991; Krauss & MacGahan, 1979; Parker, 1989;
Samuelson, 1989). Finally, companies are often reluctant to pursue people who violate
laws because of the fear of negative publicity. This is supported by the Computer
Security Institute’s 2008 survey which found that only 27% of businesses who
experienced a security incident actually reported it to the police. Additionally, the survey
reported that only 60% of companies attempted to identify the perpetrator. These two
factors undermine the reliance of General Deterrence Theory on swift, certain and
appropriately harsh penalties.
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Rational Choice Theory
While General Deterrence Theory focuses on the factors that can successfully
deter someone from committing a crime, the Rational Choice Theory focuses on the
decisions that criminals make during the commission of a crime. Rational Choice Theory
presents the idea that people make the decision to commit a crime much like they make a
decision in other mundane tasks such as buying a television or a car, a process described
by the expected utility model (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001). Even when faced with
uncertain conditions and without all necessary information, human beings choose an
outcome that will be the most favorable for them. This decision-making process is
described in a model known as the subjective utility model (Paternoster & Bachman). In
the subjective utility model, it is not assumed that humans can gather, store, and process
information perfectly; rather, they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions in order to
make the most beneficial decision they can. Even though humans go through the process
of gathering and processing information, it does not mean that they make good decisions,
nor does it mean that their interpretation of the world around them is correct (Cornish &
Clarke, 1986).
Cornish and Clarke (1986), within their subjective utility theory, described
criminals as modestly rational and contend that they often perform some type of planning
during their decision to commit a crime. It is important to note that the planning process
for robbing a convenience store is vastly different than the process for stealing a car. The
perceived benefits for each of the two aforementioned crimes are vastly different, as well.
It is through the study of criminals’ decision-making process that researchers can devise
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ways to make crime more costly to the criminal, thereby preventing a crime from
occurring.
Another important aspect of Cornish’s (1994) research on the Rational Choice
Theory is crime scripts. Originating in Gardner’s (1985) study of the field of cognitive
science, crime scripts describe the steps necessary to commit a crime. An example of a
subway mugging script is shown below in Table 4. The procedural stages of the crime
are listed under the “Scene/Function” heading and the behavior is listed under the “Script
Function” heading.
Table 4
Subway Mugging Script
Scene/Function

Script Function

Preparation

Meet and agree on hunting ground

Entry

Entry into underground system

Pre-Condition

Travel to hunting ground

Pre-Condition

Waiting/circulating at hunting ground

Instrumental Pre-Condition

Selecting victim and circumstance

Instrumental Initiation

Closing-in/preparation

Instrumental Actualization

Striking at victim

Instrumental Actualization

Pressing home attack

Doing

Take money, jewelry, etc.

Post-Condition

Escape from scene

Exit

Exit from system

(Cornish, 1994)
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The use of scripts has been quite useful in the field of criminology to model the
commission of various crimes from check fraud to the stealing of cars for resale (Lacoste
& Tremblay, 2003; Tremblay, Talon, & Hurley, 2001). Because computer crime or
misuse involves some type of planning and a systematic method, the Rational Choice
Theory and the use of scripts are appropriate vehicles for the study of this category of
crime.
Just as breaking down a programming problem into individual steps of an
algorithm can help a programmer create a program, breaking down the steps needed to
commit a particular type of computer misuse can help the information systems security
specialist define appropriate countermeasures. Using the details outlined in the 1998
U.K. Audit Report (Audit Commission, 1998), the crime outlined in the crime script in
Table 5 below shows the steps taken by a council employee who committed computer
fraud. Because his colleagues would often leave their computers unlocked during their
absence, the council employee simply accessed their computers and processed ₤15,000 of
fraud using fictitious invoices (Willison, 2006).
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Table 5
Computer Fraud Script
Scene/Function

Script Function

Preparation

Gaining access to the organization

Entry

Already an employee with access

Pre-Condition

Wait for employees to leave their offices

Instrumental Pre-Condition

Access the unattended computers

Instrumental Initiation

Access the application needed to falsify
invoices

Instrumental Actualization

Create false customer accounts

Doing

Authorization of fictitious invoices

Post-Condition

Exit the application

Exit

Exit the system

(adapted from Willison, 2006, p. 318)
Situational Crime Prevention Theory
Closely related to Rational Choice Theory is Situational Crime Prevention
Theory, developed by Clarke (1997), a theory which also focuses on the decision-making
process a would-be perpetrator goes through when deciding to commit a crime, but adds
situational factors that might influence a criminal’s decision to commit a crime. The
main difference between Rational Choice Theory and Situational Crime Prevention
Theory is that the latter focuses on the environmental factors that contribute to certain
types of crime.
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Situational Crime Prevention Theory has roots in research conducted during the
1960’s and 1970’s by the Home Office Research Unit, Britain’s governmental
criminological research department (Clarke & Cornish, 1983). In the course of
researching different methods to reduce crime, it became apparent that opportunity
reduction showed promise and warranted further investigation. For example, researchers
found that the probability of a youth re-offending while residing at a probation hostel or
training school was significantly reduced by addressing the opportunities for misbehavior
in the institutional environment itself, and not necessarily addressing factors such as the
youth’s background or personality (Tizard, Sinclair, & Clarke, 1975).
Though a focus on opportunity reducing factors is not consistent with most
current criminological research, support for this viewpoint is found in earlier studies. Burt
(1925) found that longer hours of darkness in winter promoted higher incidence of
property offending. Further, Hartshorne and May (1928) found that dishonest behavior in
children is related to the amount of supervision they experience.
Psychological research in the area of personality traits also supports the inclusion
of situational factors within the study of deviance. Overall, this research showed that
criminal behavior was influenced by environmental factors such as opportunity and
inducements rather than traditional dispositional factors (Briar & Piliavin, 1965; Matza,
1964; Short & Strodtbeck, 1965) .
From this body of research and additional research in the study of problemoriented policing, the Rational Choice Theory, as discussed previously, emerged (Clarke
& Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). It is through the combination of elements of
Rational Choice Theory and elements of Routine Activity Theory that Situational Crime
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Prevention Theory emerged. Routine Activity Theory, though not normally used to
explain computer crime, is an important theory in explaining the opportunity portion of
crime commission.
Situational Crime Prevention does not attempt to provide a panacea for the
elimination of all types of crime. Rather, it encompasses three measures that “(1) are
directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) involve the management, design or
manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as
possible, (3) make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as
judged by a wide range of offenders” (Clarke, 1997, p. 4).
Likely without realizing it, many people incorporate Situational Crime Prevention
into their everyday lives. People lock their doors when leaving their homes; they install
burglar alarms; and, tell their children not to talk to strangers (Clarke, 1997). It is within
this realm that Situational Crime Prevention operates, but with a highly targeted focus.
Due to differences in certain environmental or situational factors, the same measures
would not be used to combat both a convenience store robbery and a home robbery.
Most criminological theories focus on the offender and his/her motivations, which
are variable. Likewise, when these traditional theories are moved into the area of
computer security, their application becomes much more complex. The motivations of
those who misuse computers can vary greatly, as can their knowledge and skills. Several
researchers have developed taxonomies to describe the numerous types of computer
criminals or hackers (Hollinger, 1988; Landreth, 1985; Smith & Rupp, 2002). In direct
contrast to the more traditional criminology theories, Situational Crime Prevention does
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not attempt to explain criminal behavior or motivations. It simply attempts to make a
crime less attractive to a criminal.
In his early development of the theory, Clarke (1997) outlined 16 “opportunityreducing” techniques in his Situational Crime Prevention Theory. These 16 techniques
are grouped into four categories (Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk,
Decrease Anticipated Reward and Remove Excuses), which impact a criminal’s decision
to commit a crime through either increasing the cost or reducing the benefit, or removing
the justification for commission. For example, a countermeasure that falls under the
Increase Perceived Effort category would discourage the commission of a crime by
increasing a potential criminal’s perception that the crime would involve more effort than
he/she is willing to expend. A countermeasure that falls under the Increase Perceived
Risk category would discourage the commission of a crime by increasing the potential
criminal’s perception that a crime involves more risk than he/she is willing to tolerate. A
countermeasure that decreases a potential criminal’s anticipated reward reduces the
benefit that a criminal believes he/she will receive as a result of the crime. Lastly, a
countermeasure that removes excuses reduces a potential criminal’s ability to justify
his/her actions. Beebe and Rao (2005) added a typical traditional crime analogy and
corresponding computer misuse analogy for each of Clarke’s 16 opportunity reducing
factors, as seen in Table 1.
The success of Situational Crime Prevention Theory has been noted in several
studies. Situational measures have proven successful in practically eliminating aircraft
hijackings by screening baggage (Wilkinson, 1986) and reducing post office and bank
robberies by target hardening (Clarke, 1997; Ekblom, 1988; Gabor, 1990; Grandjean,
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1990). Application of this theory in the field of computer security, however, has yet to
be empirically explored, though the potential for success in reducing insider computer
misuse is very promising. Clarke (1997) has also noted that Situational Crime Prevention
Theory is constantly evolving and its potential for applicability in many situations
remains strong.
Situational Crime Prevention offers a holistic view of crime prevention that can
be applied to computer security that previous theories have been unable to fulfill. Beebe
and Rao (2005) proposed that previous theories and strategies have concentrated
disproportionately on a criminal’s perceived cost of committing a crime by utilizing
strategies that would increase the chances of being discovered. These strategies would
include countermeasures, such as firewalls, network monitoring software and physical
security. An effective strategy would implement countermeasures that would affect both
the criminal’s perceived cost (likelihood of being discovered and punished) and benefit
(rewards of perpetrating the crime). This strategy closely mimics previous research
which stresses the need for a combination of technical (e.g. firewalls, passwords,
encryption), formal (e.g. policies and procedures), and informal controls (e.g. education
and training programs) (Beebe & Rao).
While a number of researchers have proposed the application of Situational Crime
Prevention to combat computer misuse (Beebe & Rao, 2005; Willison, 2006; Willison &
Siponen, 2009), as of this writing, there are no empirical studies that test the relationship.
Previous theories such as General Deterrence Theory and Rational Choice Theory have
not consistently proven their empirical effectiveness, nor do they offer a holistic approach
to computer security. Moreover, with the incidents of computer misuse still at
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unacceptably high rates, especially among insiders, it is imperative that researchers
explore this relatively new theory and test its effectiveness in the field of computer
security.
As this study endeavored to explore insider computer misuse, it was necessary to
further update Beebe and Rao’s (2005) application of Situational Crime Prevention
Theory to computer security. A closer examination of the items listed in the Computer
Misuse Countermeasure column of Table 1 revealed countermeasures that are not
appropriate for a situation involving insider computer misuse, such as honeypots or
honeynets, which typically are unprotected servers that deliberately lure outside hackers
into uploading code and/or hacking tools in order to learn more about their attacks.
Therefore, the researcher updated the Computer Misuse Countermeasure column to
include countermeasures that are more appropriate for combating insider computer
misuse. The updated table appears below.
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Table 6
Updated Table with Appropriate Countermeasures for Insider Computer Misuse.
Technique

Decrease Anticipated
Rewards

Increase
Perceived Risk

Increase
Perceived Effort

1. Target hardening

2. Access control
3. Deflecting
offenders
4. Controlling
facilitators
5. Entry/exit
screenings

6. Formal
surveillance
7. Surveillance by
employees
8. Natural
surveillance
9. Target removal

10. Identifying
property
11. Reducing
temptation

12. Denying benefits

Traditional Crime
Countermeasure
Locks, safes, fences,
armed guards

Computer Misuse
Countermeasure
External firewall(s), internal
firewall(s), servers under lock and
key
Gate codes, guard shack,
ID/authentication systems,
receptionist, swipe cards
Kerberos, access control lists
Pedestrian/auto traffic
Clearly defined job duties, proxy
redirection, no loitering
servers
Gun control, limit ability
Strong password policy, required
to communicate
password change policy
Metal detectors, screeners, Virus scanning, use of software
merchandise tagging
such as Clean Access Agent for
student network access, network
log-in and log-out procedures
CCTV, security guards,
Auditing and log reviews, email
police patrols
and web usage monitoring
Responsibility and/or
Review of resource usage, user
ability to monitor
training, reporting policies
Lights, etc. so passers-by
Workstations located in visible
can see activity in the
area, cameras in data-sensitive
building
areas
Electronic donations vs.
Database
cash, cash diverted to safe partitioning/segmentation, use of
database views, VPN’s for offcampus network access
VIN etched into auto
Data classification, tagged
glass, write name in book identification of campus hardware
and software
Obscure valuables, gender Controlled distribution of campus
neutral phonebook
software, software inventory
system, use of screen saver lock
on workstations
Security coded car radios, Encryption, automatic data
ink tags on clothing
destruction mechanisms, network
packet shaping
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Remove Excuses

Technique
13. Rule
setting/clarification
14. Stimulating
conscience
16. Facilitating
compliance

Traditional Crime
Countermeasure
Acceptable use policy,
clear laws, licensing
procedures
“Shoplifting is stealing”
signs, “current speed is”
“Graffiti boards”, public
urinals, shelters, barriers

Computer Misuse
Countermeasure
Acceptable use policy, user
agreements, clear rules and
procedures
Dissemination of anti-misuse
information, codes of ethics
Offer software at reduced prices,
required new user training on
proper use of systems

The majority of the countermeasures in the updated table above were derived
from an extensive review of computer security literature. Please see Tables 2 and 3 for
appropriate references.
One of the main tenets of Situational Crime Prevention Theory is that it can be
tailored to individual environments, making it an ideal base for computer security in
higher education. The unique mixture of environments in higher education demands a
scalable and flexible solution to computer misuse. Therefore, this study explored the
relationships between insider computer misuse countermeasures that fall under
Situational Crime Prevention’s 16 opportunity-reducing techniques and the number of
known incidents of insider computer misuse for certain institutions of higher education.
Chapter Summary
Straub (1990) defined computer misuse as “unauthorized and deliberate misuse of
assets of the local organizational information system by individuals” (p. 257). Examples
of misuse might include unauthorized network access, tampering with or stealing
sensitive data, abusing e-mail privileges, or installing unlicensed software. Many
industry surveys have shown that insider computer misuse, or misuse that is committed
by an employee, is a pervasive problem for businesses (Computer Security Institute,
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2007; Computer Security Institute, 2008; Department for Business Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, 2007). Insider computer misuse has also been identified as a
problem, though with fewer incidents, in higher education (Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006).
Numerous studies have recommended a number of different countermeasures to
combat the problem of insider computer misuse. Countermeasures can either be
classified as technical or administrative. The most common technical countermeasures
found in the literature include authentication for resource access, monitoring software,
and data access control using security levels (Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007;
Panko & Beh, 2002; Straub, 1990; Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002).
Though technical countermeasures are extremely important, many authors reflect
upon the propensity of some companies to rely solely on these technical countermeasures
(Osborne, 1998; Parker, 1997; von Solms, 2001). With a complete emphasis on technical
controls, the administrative category of countermeasures is ignored, creating a very onesided security plan. The most common administrative countermeasures are Acceptable
Use Policies, Codes of Ethics, password policies, and employee training.
Despite the presence of countermeasures, insider computer misuse still occurs. In
a higher education environment, this could be due to the idea that effective
implementation of computer security is difficult in a higher education setting, mainly due
to environment and culture. Academic freedom is a tradition in higher education, but
does not blend with the controlling nature of computer security. There is a constant
struggle between an computer security specialist’s need to implement a strong security
plan and academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration (Oblinger, 2003).
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Though higher education campuses face some unique challenges when it comes to
combating insider computer misuse, lessons can be learned by studying computer misuse
in the business world. An even richer understanding comes from studying the problem
from a criminological standpoint.
Situational Crime Prevention Theory appears to be a good fit for preventing
insider computer misuse in higher education because of its inherent flexibility. As the
environment and culture of higher education can vary from institution to institution, and
even within a single institution, this flexibility allows computer security specialists to
tailor a security plan based on a campus’ individual needs. Therefore, this study explored
the relationship between Situational Crime Prevention Theory and insider computer
misuse on campuses of public, four-year colleges and universities in the United States.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Introduction
Insider computer misuse is a problem in every industry, with consequences
ranging from financial losses and loss of productivity to reputation damage. Although
research has shown that insider computer misuse is a problem on college and university
campuses (Cronan, Foltz, & Jones, 2006; Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006), the bulk of
computer security research has been conducted in the business sector. Further, while
researchers agree that insider computer misuse is a problem, no one method for
combating this misuse emerges in the literature. Most authors recommend a mixture of
technical countermeasures, such as network and email monitoring, and administrative
countermeasures, such as Acceptable Use Policies.
Situational Crime Prevention Theory assumes a number of technical and
administrative countermeasures to prevent computer misuse. When applied to the field of
information technology, a more holistic approach to preventing insider computer misuse
emerges. However, to date, there does not appear to be a study in either the business
environment or higher education environment regarding the relationship between
Situational Crime Prevention and insider computer misuse.
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between the
categories of countermeasures in Situational Crime Prevention Theory and the number of
insider computer misuse on college campuses. The researcher explored the above
relationships as an effort to help campus technology departments choose the most
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efficient and effective security countermeasures. From this data, the researcher
responded to the following research questions and null hypotheses.
Research Questions
R1 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived effort to commit
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on
campus?
H1: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the
perceived effort to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider
computer misuse incidents on campus.
R2 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived risk of
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse
incidents on campus?
H2: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the
perceived risk of committing insider computer misuse and the number of insider
computer misuse incidents on campus.
R3 – To what extent are the countermeasures that decrease the anticipated reward for
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse
incidents on campus?
H3: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that decrease the
anticipated reward for committing insider computer misuse and the number of
insider computer misuse incidents on campus.
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R4 – To what extent are the countermeasures that remove the excuses for committing
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on
campus?
H4: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that remove the
excuses for committing insider computer misuse and the number of insider
computer misuse incidents on campus.
R5 – What are the respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived
effectiveness?
Research Design
As this study aimed to explore the relationship Situational Crime Prevention
Theory’s four categories of countermeasures and the number of known insider computer
misuse incidents in the year 2009, a quantitative approach was the most appropriate.
Further, the collected data were numeric in nature and there was no need for open-ended
questions. Therefore, the data were collected using a web-accessible questionnaire
created in SurveyMonkey©.
The researcher posited that a relationship exists between the number of
countermeasures in place at each institution and the number of computer misuse incidents
experienced at each institution. Therefore, the independent variables are the categories of
countermeasures from Situational Crime Prevention Theory: countermeasures to increase
the perceived effort of the offender, countermeasures to increase the perceived risk of the
offender, countermeasures to decrease the anticipated reward of the offender, and
countermeasures to remove the excuses for the offender. The dependent variable is the
number of known incidents of insider computer misuse in the year 2009.
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Figure 2 below shows this study’s conceptual framework with labeled hypotheses
between the constructs.
Situational Crime Prevention
Categories of Countermeasures

Increase
Perceived
Effort

Increase
Perceived
Risk

Decrease
Anticipated
Reward

H1

H2

Insider
computer
misuse
incidents in
higher
education
institutions

H3

H4

Increase
Perceived
Effort

Figure 2: Conceptual Framework with Labeled Hypotheses
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Sample and Sampling
The population for the current research study was public, four-year colleges and
universities in the United States. By targeting only public, four-year colleges and
universities and not including two-year or private institutions, it was hoped that
differences in extraneous variables such as budget, size of technology staff, and mission
of the institution would be mitigated. According to the National Center for Education
Statistics, there are currently 652 public, four-year colleges and universities in the United
States.
The respondents for the current research were Chief Information Officers (CIO’s)
or administrators of equivalent position at public, four-year colleges and universities
within the United States. As the survey requested data regarding countermeasures found
within the field of computer security, a CIO or equivalent administrator at each campus
was identified as the most knowledgeable person to participate in the study. The names
and email addresses of each CIO were gathered using information on each campus’
website, from the governing body for higher education in each state, from Educause, an
organization for the advancement of technology in higher education, and, failing all of
the above, a phone call to each institution. The researcher found 442 names and email
addresses for CIO’s or administrators of equivalent position at public, four-year
institutions across the United States.
In return for their response, each respondent was offered a copy of the results so
that he/she can compare the countermeasures in place at his/her campus with those in
place at other institutions. In order to provide the most useful data possible to each CIO,
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the results were categorized based on institution size. Institution size was included solely
for the purpose of providing data to the participants and was not used for analysis.
Instrumentation
As there is currently no instrument available to properly measure the variables in
this study, the instrument was researcher-developed. Initial development of the
instrument began by using a modified version of Beebe and Rao’s (2005) initial mapping
of Clarke’s (2007) original 16 Situational Crime Prevention countermeasures to the field
of computer security. A listing of the countermeasures with the corresponding
questionnaire items appears below in Table 7.
Table 7
Countermeasures and Corresponding Questionnaire Items

Increase
Perceived Effort

Technique

Traditional Crime
Countermeasure
1. Target hardening Locks, safes,
fences, armed
guards
2. Access control
Gate codes, guard
shack, receptionist,
swipe cards
3. Deflecting
Pedestrian/auto
offenders
traffic redirection,
no loitering
4. Controlling
Gun control, limit
facilitators
ability to
communicate

Computer Misuse
Countermeasure
External firewall(s),
internal firewall(s), servers
under lock and key
ID/authentication systems,
Kerberos, access control
lists
Clearly defined job duties,
proxy servers

Question/Item
Numbers
Question 3,
items 1-3

Strong password policy,
required password change
policy

Question 3,
items 9-10

Question 3,
items 4-6
Question 3,
items 7-8
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Increase
Perceived Risk

Technique
5. Entry/exit
screenings

6. Formal
surveillance
7. Surveillance by
employees

Decrease Anticipated
Rewards

8. Natural
surveillance

9. Target removal

10. Identifying
property
11. Reducing
temptation

12. Denying
benefits

Traditional Crime
Countermeasure
Metal detectors,
screeners,
merchandise
tagging

CCTV, security
guards, police
patrols
Responsibility
and/or ability to
monitor
Lights, etc. so
passers-by can see
activity in the
building
Electronic
donations vs. cash,
cash diverted to
safe
VIN etched into
auto glass, write
name in book
Obscure valuables,
gender neutral
phonebook

Security coded car
radios, ink tags on
clothing

Computer Misuse
Countermeasure
Virus scanning, use of
software such as Clean
Access Agent for student
network access, network
log-in and log-out
procedures
Auditing and log reviews,
email and web usage
monitoring
Review of resource usage,
user training, reporting
policies
Workstations located in
visible area, cameras in
data-sensitive areas

Question/Item
Numbers
Question 3,
items 11-13

Database
partitioning/segmentation,
use of database views,
VPN’s for off-campus
network access
Data classification, tagged
identification of campus
hardware and software
Controlled distribution of
campus software, software
inventory system, use of
screen saver lock on
workstations
Encryption, automatic data
destruction mechanisms,
network packet shaping

Question 3,
items 22-24

Question 3,
items 14-16
Question 3,
items 17-19
Question 3,
items 20-21

Question 3,
items 25-27
Question 3,
items 28-30

Question 3,
items 31-33
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Remove Excuses

Technique
13. Rule
setting/clarification

14. Stimulating
conscience
15. Controlling
disinhibitors

16. Facilitating
compliance

Traditional Crime
Countermeasure
Acceptable use
policy, clear laws,
licensing
procedures
“Shoplifting is
stealing” signs,
“current speed is”
Controlling
drugs/alcohol,
propaganda,
violent TV
“Graffiti boards”,
public urinals,
shelters, barriers

Computer Misuse
Countermeasure
Acceptable use policy,
user agreements, clear
rules and procedures

Question/Item
Numbers
Question 3,
items 34-36

Dissemination of antimisuse information, codes
of ethics
Cyber-ethics education,
supervised computer use,
employee access to
approved websites only
Offer software at reduced
prices, required new user
training on proper use of
systems

Question 3,
items 37-38
Question 3,
items 39-41

Question 3,
items 42-43

The countermeasures used in the updated table were derived from an extensive literature
review. Appropriate references for each countermeasure are seen in Tables 2 and 3. After
reviewing the data gathered from Beebe and Rao’s (2005) table and the literature, the
researcher constructed the questionnaire, as presented in Appendix A.
The respondents were given a list of specific countermeasures and asked if they
utilize any of those countermeasures on their campus. If a CIO checks the box next to a
particular countermeasure indicating that this countermeasure is in place at his/her
campus, that data was recorded as a 1. The absence of a checkmark was recorded as a 0.
The last question on the questionnaire asked the respondents to rank their top five
countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness. This data provided additional
insight into the state of computer security in higher education by identifying the most
popular countermeasures that CIO’s have implemented on their campuses.

66
Pilot Study
As the instrument used in this study was researcher-developed, a pilot study was
required to ensure the listed countermeasures and wording are appropriate. A pilot study
consisting of CIO’s from eight colleges and universities within the state of Georgia was
conducted. Data from these institutions were not included in the final data collection.
The CIO’s from these eight institutions were sent an email containing a link to the
questionnaire, information about the research, and the expectations regarding their
participation in the pilot study. Separate from the questionnaire, pilot study respondents
were asked to provide feedback based on their experiences when responding to the
questionnaire. In particular, they were asked to identify any terms that were unclear or
needed additional clarification. A representative copy of the email sent to each CIO is
found in Appendix B. Based on this feedback, the researcher updated the questionnaire.
Data Collection
Data collection began with an email to each CIO in the population. A copy of the
email is in Appendix C. The email contained a link to the questionnaire in
SurveyMonkey©. All of the collected data were numeric in nature, and there were no
open-ended questions to code.
In its electronic format, the questionnaire was five pages in length with a total of 4
questions. Questions 3 and 4 each contained 43 items. None of the questions required a
free-form answer except for the question which asked the number of known computer
misuse incidents in the year 2009. Therefore, it was estimated that each respondent
should have completed the questionnaire quickly with a minimum time commitment of
no more than 15 minutes. It is also important to note that each question in the
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questionnaire required a response. Therefore, there should have been no incomplete
questionnaires. However, incomplete questionnaires were still recorded and were
subsequently discarded.
In order to maintain absolute anonymity for the respondents, the option to collect
IP addresses was turned off in SurveyMonkey©. Therefore, the researcher could not
utilize the address book feature in SurveyMonkey© for follow-up requests. However, a
repeat email to each of the CIO’s was completed approximately five days after the initial
invitation requesting response. As an incentive to fill out the questionnaire, the researcher
offered, by request, a copy of the data results to each CIO. Twelve CIO’s requested a
copy of the results.
Data Analysis
The collected data were analyzed using PLS-Graph, a software package for
statistical analysis. As this study aimed to explore the relationship between the four
categories of countermeasures and the number of known insider computer misuse
incidents in the year 2009, PLS-Graph was deemed an ideal software package for
analysis. PLS-Graph utilizes latent variable path modeling using the Partial Least Squares
approach. Additionally, PLS-Graph is less sensitive to matters such as sample size and
data distributions when compared to other structural equation modeling software and
SPSS (Chin, 1998). In its analysis, PLS-Graph estimates the loadings between items and
constructs, the path coefficients, and the correlations between the constructs in the
proposed framework. Finally, PLS-Graph calculates t-values, which, when compared to
calculated critical values, provides a basis for exploring the relationship between the
constructs (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000).

68
Reporting the Data
The data were reported in tabular format, as a tabular format was most suitable for
reporting the numeric results of the statistical tests. Finally, the four hypotheses and one
research question were addressed individually and grouped with supporting data.
Chapter Summary
Insider computer misuse is a problem for all industries, including colleges and
universities. With ever-shrinking resources, institutions of higher education must
implement an effective and efficient security plan to combat this particular type of
computer misuse. In an effort to help colleges and universities adopt an appropriate
security policy and plan, the current research explores the relationship between categories
of countermeasures outlined in Situational Crime Prevention Theory, and the number of
known insider computer misuse incidents experienced in the year 2009.
The population of the current research was all Chief Information Officers (CIO’s)
of public, four-year colleges and universities in the United States, effectively rendering
the population and sample equivalent. The number of public, four-year colleges and
universities in the United States is 652. However, the researcher was able to find CIO or
equivalent administrator names and email addresses for 442 institutions.
The questionnaire was web-accessible using SurveyMonkey©. Each CIO received
an invitation to complete the questionnaire, with an offer to share certain aspects of the
data in return for their participation.
The instrument was researcher-developed, necessitating thorough use of expert
review and a pilot study of eight campuses. Results of the pilot study were used to
improve the clarity of the questionnaire, with an emphasis on appropriate terminology.
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Further, composite reliability and factor analysis was completed to ensure that the
questions within each category are appropriately related.
Data analysis was completed using PLS-Graph. Descriptive statistics were
computed followed by computation of path coefficients, t statistic analysis, and R-square
analysis to determine the relationship between the latent constructs and predictive utility.
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CHAPTER IV
REPORT OF DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS
Introduction
Insider computer misuse is a problem for all industry sectors, including higher
education, and consequences can range from financial losses to reputation damage
(Computer Crime and Security Survey, 2008; Cronan, Foltz, & Jones, 2006; Department
for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2007; Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006).
Though many researchers have addressed the prevention of computer misuse, no clear
solution exists. Most authors recommend a mixture of technical and administrative
countermeasures to best combat the issue, though there is little agreement among the
authors’ findings. Moreover, much of the literature on computer misuse is limited to the
business sector, leaving colleges and universities a relatively unstudied group. Therefore,
the current research proposed to apply a theory which offers a balanced mixture of
administrative and technical controls, Situational Crime Prevention, and investigate
whether a relationship exists between Situational Crime Prevention’s controls and the
number of campus insider computer misuse incidents.
Using a questionnaire administered through SurveyMonkey©, the researcher asked
the CIO’s of 442 public, four-year institutions of higher education in the United States
about the number of insider computer misuse incidents in the year 2009, the
countermeasures they have in place on their campus, and to rank their top five
countermeasures in terms of effectiveness. A complete copy of the questionnaire is
found in Appendix A.
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Using the data gathered through the questionnaire described above, the researcher
endeavored to answer the research questions and corresponding null hypotheses listed in
Chapter III. In this chapter, the researcher presented findings from the pilot study,
changes made to the instrument as a result of the pilot study, and analysis of findings
from the data collection.
Research Design
Pilot Study Procedures
As described in Chapter III, CIO’s from eight colleges and universities within the
University System of Georgia participated in the pilot study. Over a two-week period,
the respondents were contacted individually with an email almost identical to Appendix
B. The only changes to the invitation email were some personalization. After one
reminder email, the response rate was 100%.
As clear and unambiguous terminology is particularly important to this
questionnaire, pilot study respondents were asked to provide feedback to the researcher
outlining any recommended changes to the questionnaire terminology and an estimation
of how long it took each of them to complete the questionnaire. Six out of eight
respondents provided feedback. Based on the pilot study respondents’ suggestions, some
of the wording was changed in the questionnaire, but the essential format of the
questionnaire remained unchanged. Specifically, questions 1, 3, and 4 were modified
slightly to reflect recommendations from the pilot study respondents. Question 1 was
edited to specify from which term the respondent should report his/her institution’s
FTE’s. In question 3, the item “Encryption” was changed to add different types of
encryption, such as SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), and
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password encryption. The Encryption item was identically changed in question 4. The
last page of the questionnaire was also changed. The last sentence originally read “You
may now close your browser.” As the page included a “Done” button, one respondent
felt that sentence was confusing. The sentence was changed to state “You may now click
the Done button below or close your browser.” Finally, all respondents who indicated
how long it took to fill out the questionnaire stated that the process took less than 10
minutes.
Data Results from Pilot Study
Data results for each respondent are shown in Table 8. The number represented
under the category is a count of the number of countermeasures within that category that
the CIO reported he/she had in place on his/her campus.
Table 8
Pilot Study Data by Respondent
Respondent Misuse
Increase
Incidents Perceived
Effort
1
10
6
2
5
5
3
20
7
4
15
9
5
5
7
6
2
7
7
1
9
8
8
7

Increase
Perceived
Risk
3
5
6
6
4
7
5
4

Decrease
Anticipated
Rewards
2
6
5
8
5
7
8
3

Remove
Excuses
2
5
5
6
2
2
4
3

Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 show each countermeasure within the categories of
Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards and
Remove Excuses and the percentage of institutions that utilizes each countermeasure.
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Table 9
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Increase Perceived
Effort
Technique

Countermeasure

Target
Hardening

External firewalls

Percentage of Institutions that
Utilize the Countermeasure
(n =8)
100%

Internal firewalls

88%

Access
Control

Servers under lock and key

100%

ID Authentication

100%

Kerberos

25%

Access control lists

63%

Deflecting
Offenders

Clearly defined job duties

50%

Proxy Servers

13%

Controlling
Facilitators

Strong password policy

88%

Required password change
policy

88%
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Table 10
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Increase Perceived Risk
Technique

Countermeasure

Entry/Exit
Screenings

Virus scanning

Formal
surveillance

Surveillance
by
employees

Natural
surveillance

Percentage of
Institutions that Utilize
the Countermeasure
(n =8)
100%

Rules regarding joining
campus network
Network log in/log out
procedures
Auditing and log reviews

88%

Email usage monitoring

0%

Web usage monitoring

13%

Review of resource usage

13%

User training

13%

Reporting policies

13%

Workstations located in
visible areas
Cameras in data sensitive
areas

63%

63%
50%

63%
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Table 11
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Decrease Anticipated
Rewards
Technique

Countermeasure

Target
removal

Database partitioning/
Segmentation
Database views

Identifying
property

Reducing
temptation

Denying
benefits

Percentage of Institutions that
Utilize the Countermeasure
(n =8)
25%
50%

Virtual Private Networks

88%

Data classification

25%

Tagged identification of
campus hardware
Tagged identification of
campus software
Software inventory
system
Controlled distribution of
campus software
Use of screen saver locks

75%

Encryption

50%

Automatic data
destruction mechanisms
Network packet shaping

13%
38%
75%
50%

0%
63%
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Table 12
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Remove Excuses
Technique

Countermeasure

Rule setting/ Acceptable use policy
Clarification
User agreements

Stimulating
conscience
Controlling
disinhibitors

Facilitating
compliance

Percentage of Institutions that
Utilize the Countermeasure
(n =8)
100%
50%

Clear rules and
procedures
Dissemination of antimisuse information
Codes of ethics

38%

Cyber-ethics education

13%

Supervised computer use

25%

Employee access to
approved websites only
Offer software at reduced
prices
Required new user
training on proper use of
systems

13%

0%
50%

50%
25%

As research question five is concerned with the respondent’s top five
countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness, Table 13 below shows a ranking of
the top five countermeasures. The score was determined by first transposing the data. For
example, if the countermeasure External Firewalls received a score of 5 from one of the
respondents, that particular respondent ranked External Firewalls as one of his/her top
five countermeasures but at the bottom of the effectiveness scale. Therefore, the score of
5 would be converted to a 1. Similarly, a score of 4 would be converted to a 2, a 3 would
remain a 3, a 2 would become a 4 and a 1 would become a 5. In essence, the scores
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would simply be reversed so that, when summed, an accurate ranking could be
determined. As a result of the pilot study, the questionnaire was changed to make scoring
of this item simpler. The respondents were asked to rank their most effective
countermeasure with a 5, their next most effective countermeasure with a 4, and so on.
Table 13
Top Five Countermeasures in Terms of Perceived Effectiveness
Countermeasure

Score

External firewalls

26

ID and password authentication

20

Virus scanning

16

Servers under lock and key

13

Acceptable use policy

5

Following completion of the pilot study, IRB approval from Georgia Southern
University was obtained. Official approval is attached as Appendix D. The researcher
then began the data collection process.
Respondents
The respondents were CIO’s or persons of equivalent position at public, 4-year
colleges and universities in the United States. The researcher did not request any
demographic information about the respondents within the questionnaire.
Response Rate
The researcher was able to find 442 contact names out of 652 public, 4-year
institutions in the United States. Therefore, emails were sent to the CIO’s or persons of
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equivalent position at 442 institutions. Of these 442 invitation emails, 101 attempted the
questionnaire, for a response rate of 23%. Two emails were sent to each respondent, an
initial invitation and a follow-up email.
To assure that enough responses were received to perform data analysis, the
researcher referenced Cohen’s (1992) table for power analysis. According to Cohen’s
table, for a medium effect size at the .05 significance level for four independent variables,
a total of 84 responses would be adequate for data analysis
Findings and Analysis
At the end of the data collection period, the researcher began analysis by
downloading the data into an Excel spreadsheet. A copy of the raw data is included in
Appendix E. The data were then examined, and unusable or incomplete records were
deleted. An unusable record is one where, most often, a respondent would type “don’t
know” or “test” for the question that asked about the number of computer misuse
incidents their institution experienced in the year 2009. After eliminating unusable
records, the number of complete responses was 89.
Next, variable names were created based on the technique being implemented.
For example, in Table 7, the first technique in column 1 is target hardening. The
corresponding computer misuse countermeasures for target hardening are external
firewalls, internal firewalls, and servers under lock and key. Therefore, the respondents
answer to whether his/her institution utilized external firewalls would be represented by
TH1 (target hardening, first question), and his/her answer to whether the institution
utilized internal firewalls would be TH2 (target hardening, second question). The same
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naming scheme was used for each countermeasure within each technique. An answer of
“yes” was recorded as a 1, and an answer of “no” was recorded as a 0.
As the hypotheses are concerned with overall categories of countermeasures, i.e.
Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and
Remove Excuses, the responses for each countermeasure under each category were
assigned to a variable representing each category, i.e. IPE for Increase Perceived Effort,
IPR for Increase Perceived Risk, DAR for Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and RE for
Remove Excuses.
The final part of preparing the data for analysis involved creating categories for
the number of computer misuse incidents each institution reported on the questionnaire.
This was completed because of the excessive number of outliers in the original data. The
category instead of the reported number was used for data analysis. The categories appear
below in Table 14.
Table 14
Categories of Computer Misuse Incidents
Category
0
1
2
3
4
5

Number of Incidents
0
Between 1 and 25, inclusive
Between 26 and 50, inclusive
Between 51 and 75, inclusive
Between 76 and 100, inclusive
Greater than 100

Descriptive Statistics
It is important to look at the data as a whole before any analysis is completed for
each research question and hypothesis. Table 15 below shows how many of the 89
respondents utilize each countermeasure listed on the questionnaire.
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Table 15
Number of Respondents that Utilize Each Countermeasure (n=89)
Category

Technique
Target Hardening

Increase
Perceived
Effort

Access Control
Deflecting
Offenders
Controlling
Facilitators

Entry/Exit
Screenings

Formal
Surveillance
Increase
Perceived Risk
Surveillance by
Employees

Natural
Surveillance

Countermeasure
External firewall
Internal firewall
Servers under lock and key
ID/password authentication
Kerberos
Access control list(s)
Clearly defined job duties
Proxy servers
Employees must use strong
passwords
Employees must change
passwords regularly
Virus scanning
Rules regarding joining
campus network
Network log-in and log-out
procedures
Auditing and log reviews
Employee email monitoring
Employee web usage
monitoring
Review of resource usage
information
User training related to
security policy
Reporting policies for
misuse incidents
Workstations located in
visible areas
Cameras in data-sensitive
areas

Item
TH1
TH2
TH3
AC1
AC2
AC3
DO1
DO2
CF1

Yes
86%
84%
90%
97%
35%
87%
81%
45%
81%

No
14%
16%
10%
3%
65%
13%
19%
55%
19%

CF2

78%

22%

EES1 98%
EES2 73%

2%
27%

EES3 57%

43%

FS1
FS2
FS3

70%
8%
3%

30%
92%
97%

SE1

35%

65%

SE2

70%

30%

SE3

78%

22%

NS1

37%

63%

NS2

33%

77%
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Category

Decrease
Anticipated
Rewards

Technique

Countermeasure
Database
partitioning/segmentation
Target Removal
Use of database views
Use of virtual private
networks
Data classification
Tagged identification of
Identifying
campus hardware
Property
Tagged identification of
campus software
Use of software inventory
system
Reducing
Controlled distribution of
Temptation
campus software
Use of screen saver lock on
workstations
Encryption
Automatic data destruction
Denying Benefits
mechanisms
Network packet shaping
Acceptable use policy
Rule Setting/
Clarification

User agreements
Clear rules and procedures

Remove
Excuses

Stimulating
Conscience

Controlling
Disinhibitors

Facilitating
Compliance

Multiple dissemination
methods of anti-misuse
information
Code(s) of ethics
Cyber-ethics education
Supervised computer use
Employee access to only
approved websites
Offer software at reduced
prices
Required user training on
proper use of campus
systems

Item
TR1

Yes
62%

No
38%

TR2
TR3

67%
91%

33%
9%

IP1
IP2

64%
73%

36%
27%

IP3

20%

80%

RT1

38%

62%

RT2

71%

29%

RT3

72%

28%

DB1
DB2

89%
15%

11%
85%

DB3
RSC
1
RSC
2
RSC
3
SC1

67%
94%

33%
6%

63%

37%

67%

33%

40%

60%

SC2
CD1
CD2
CD3

40%
21%
11%
8%

60%
79%
89%
92%

FC1

69%

31%

FC2

37%

63%

Finally, the data were imported into PLS-Graph. Analysis began with construct
validity and discriminant validity calculations, and calculation of composite reliability.
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Next, path coefficients and t statistics were calculated for addressing hypotheses one
though four. Though the majority of the data in this study is dichotomous, it is
appropriate to analyze dichotomous data in the same manner as interval data. Interval
data is defined as having a set measurement scale of known magnitude. Likewise,
dichotomous data can be defined as having two scales of known magnitude (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1984).
Construct Validity
Construct validity was calculated based on examination of item loadings to
construct correlations. The steps utilized to complete construct validity are outlined in
Gefen and Straub (2005). In general terms, the item loadings on the latent constructs were
calculated in PLS-Graph. The output from this calculation was imported into an Excel
spreadsheet, and this spreadsheet data were then imported into SPSS, software designed
specifically for statistical analysis. Excel was needed because data cannot be directly
transferred from PLS-Graph to SPSS. Once in SPSS, bivariate correlations were
calculated, and the item loadings on each construct were examined. Table 16 below
shows each construct with its corresponding items and loadings. Composite reliability
with all items included is shown, as well as composite reliability with low loading items
removed. Some items are denoted with an asterisks (*), which indicates that the item was
removed from the construct due to a low loading value. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001)
assert that each item should possess a loading value of at least .32 in relation to its
construct.
Composite reliability was developed by Werts, Linn, and Jӧreskog (1974) and is a
measure of internal consistency similar to Cronbach’s alpha. The difference is that
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composite reliability does not assume tau equivalency among the measures. The values
of computed composite reliability and computed Cronbach’s alpha should be interpreted
similarly. Per Nunnally (1967), an alpha level as low as .6 can be considered sufficient
for the early stages of basic research.
Table 16
Constructs with Associated Loadings and Composite Reliability
Construct

Increase
Perceived Effort

Increase
Perceived Risk

Items

TH1
TH2*
TH3
AC1
AC2*
AC3*
DO1
DO2
CF1
CF2*
EES1
EES2
EES3*
FS1
FS2*
FS3*
SE1*
SE2*
SE3*
NS1*
NS2

Loadings

Composite
Reliability with
All Items
.651

Composite
Reliability
with Low
Items Deleted
.770

.572

.743

.332
.066
.787
.741
.166
.264
.462
.377
.559
.093
.500
.418
.059
.468
.159
.036
.023
.191
.029
.235
.541
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Construct

Decrease
Anticipated
Rewards

Items

TR1
TR2*
TR3
IP1*
IP2*
IP3*
RT1*
RT2
RT3
DB1
DB2
DB3*

Remove Excuses

Loadings

Composite
Reliability with
All Items
.625

Composite
Reliability
with Low
Items Deleted
.695

.541

.679

.344
.265
.604
.027
.035
.273
.279
.531
.443
.541
.516
.265

RSC1*
.014
RSC2*
.079
RSC3*
.089
SC1
.378
SC2*
.153
CD1
.718
CD2
.350
CD3
.394
FC1
.583
FC2
.411
* item removed from analysis due to low loading value
Discriminant Validity
Following removal of the low loading items, discriminant validity was conducted
to verify that each item correlates highest with the construct that it purports to measure
(Gefen & Straub, 2005). Table 17 shows each item and its correlation value for each
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construct. The values in bold confirm that each item correlates highest with its associated
construct.
Table 17
Discriminant Validity Correlation Values
Item
TH1
TH3
AC1
DO1
DO2
CF1
EES1
EES2
FS1
NS2
TR1
TR3
RT2
RT3
DB1
DB2
SC1
CD1
CD2
CD3
FC1
FC2

IPE
.332
.787
.741
.462
.377
.559
.451
.210
.259
.121
.142
.474
.324
.200
.306
.101
.338
.158
.098
.021
.179
.225

IPR
.127
.242
.385
.248
.053
.210
.500
.418
.468
.541
.139
.198
.258
.221
.268
.260
.122
.237
.295
.327
.026
.177

DAR
.183
.403
.539
.229
.202
.278
.513
.213
.255
.328
.344
.604
.531
.443
.541
.516
.272
.219
.233
.251
.152
.237

RE
.086
.094
.031
.086
.095
.035
.050
.045
.060
.095
.252
.047
.058
.110
.035
.048
.378
.718
.350
.394
.583
.411

Data Analysis
Using PLS-Graph, path coefficients and t-statistics were computed using a
bootstrapping resampling technique. In PLS-Graph, bootstrapping involves resampling
with replacement from the original sample. The following analysis was conducted using
200 resamples as recommended by Chin (1998). The licensing agreement for PLS-Graph
is included in Appendix F. A screenshot of the resulting graphical representation of the
model constructs with associated survey questions is included below in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Screenshot of PLS-Graph Model Construct with Associated Survey Questions
The model complete with independent and dependent constructs, their path
coefficients, and R-square value were included below in Figure 4.
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Increase Perceived
Effort

Increase
Perceived Risk

H1
-.121

H2
-.193

H3
-.203
Decrease
Anticipated
Rewards

Reported Incidents of
Computer Misuse
(R-square = .259)

H4
.392

Remove
Excuses

Figure 4: Model Representation from PLS-Graph with Path Coefficients and R-Square
Value
The next step in analysis was to compute the critical value using the t distribution
table, α = .05, a one-tailed test, and degrees of freedom of 88 (n – 1). Using these
parameters, the critical value was 1.662. To determine whether or not to reject
hypotheses one through five, the t statistic generated by PLS-Graph was compared with
the critical value. Therefore, if the t statistic was greater than the critical value of 1.662, a
relationship between the construct and the dependent variable existed and the hypothesis
was rejected. If the t statistic was less than or equal to the critical value of 1.662, there
was no relationship between the construct and the dependent variable, and the hypothesis
was not rejected.
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Hypothesis 1.
H1: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the perceived
effort to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse
incidents on campus.
Finding and Discussion.
The path coefficient between the construct of Increase Perceived Effort and the
dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was negative at .121. The t
statistic was 1.019, which is less than the critical value of 1.662. Therefore, H1 should
not be rejected.
Hypothesis 2.
H2: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the perceived
risk to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse
incidents on campus.
Finding and Discussion.
The path coefficient between the construct of Increase Perceived Risk and the
dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was negative at .193. The t
statistic was 1.621, which is just under the critical value of 1.662. Therefore, H2 should
not be rejected.
Hypothesis 3.
H3: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that decrease the anticipated
rewards to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse
incidents on campus.
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Finding and Discussion.
The path coefficient between the construct of Decrease Anticipated Rewards and
the dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was significant with a
negative value of .203. The t statistic was 1.919, which is greater than the critical value of
1.662. Therefore, hypothesis 3 should be rejected.
Hypothesis 4.
H4: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that remove the excuses to
commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse incidents on
campus.
Finding and Discussion.
The path coefficient between the construct of Remove Excuses and the dependent
variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was significant at .368. The t statistic
was 2.697, which is greater than the critical value of 1.662. Therefore, H4 should be
rejected.
Predictive Value of Model.
In order to examine the predictive value of the model, it was necessary to look at
the R-square value computed by PLS-Graph. For the current model, the R-square value is
.26, which is interpreted as 26% of the variance in the Number of Computer Misuse
Incidents is explained by the constructs Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived
Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and Remove Excuses. Additionally, the construct
that appears to have the greatest negative influence on the Number of Computer Misuse
Incidents is Decrease Anticipated Rewards, with a negative path coefficient of .203.
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Research Question 5.
R5 – What are the respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived
effectiveness?
Finding and Discussion.
Respondents were asked to identify their top five countermeasures in terms of
perceived effectiveness and then rank those five using a scale of 5 to 1, with 5
corresponding to the countermeasure with the most perceived effectiveness. The top five
countermeasures with the corresponding score are shown in Table 18 below.

Table 18
Respondents’ Top Five Countermeasures in Terms of Perceived Effectiveness with Score
Ranking
Countermeasure
ID and password authentication
External firewalls
Employees must use strong passwords
Virus scanning
User training related to security policy

Score
142
121
121
114
103

It is interesting to note that three out of the five top countermeasures would fall into the
Increase Perceived Effort category, which did not demonstrate a significant relationship
with the number of computer misuse incidents. The fact that three of the five
countermeasures are technical in nature supports Beebe and Rao’s (2005) assertion that
most security plans are imbalanced in favor of technical countermeasures, while often
overlooking the more human or administrative controls.
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Calculated Observed Power.
A Type II error occurs when a researcher fails to reject a false null hypothesis. To
calculate the probability of a Type II error, the researcher calculated the power of the
current test using the parameters of α = .05, number of predictors = 4, R-square = .259,
and sample size = 89. The calculated power was .997 (Soper, 2010). Therefore, the
probability of failing to reject a false null hypothesis for this study is .3%.
Chapter Summary
Data analysis began with the completion of a pilot study consisting of eight
colleges and universities within the University System of Georgia. Pilot study
respondents were also asked to provide feedback regarding the terminology used in the
questionnaire and whether it was clear and appropriate, and how long it took them to
complete the questionnaire. Using suggestions from the pilot study group, the
questionnaire was edited.
After acquiring IRB approval, the researcher sent out invitation emails asking
CIO’s of 442 public, 4-year colleges and universities for their participation in the study.
From these 442 invitations, a total of 101 people responded, with 89 responses deemed
usable. This low response rate prompted the researcher to perform power analysis, which
indicated that 84 responses would be sufficient for analysis.
For the remaining hypotheses, based on comparison of t statistics and critical
values, H3 and H4 should be rejected, and H1 and H2 should not be rejected. The
calculated power of the current test was .997. The predictive value of the model was
examined using the calculated R-square value of .259, which is interpreted as 26% of the
variance in Number of Computer Misuse Incidents is explained by the model.
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The respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness
were, in order, ID and password authentication, external firewalls, employee use of
strong passwords, virus scanning, and user training related to security policy. It is
interesting to note four of the five top countermeasures are technology-dependent, while
only one addressed the more human or administrative side of security controls.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
High-profile computer misuse incidents, such as the compromise of the Large
Hadron Collider, tend to capture the media’s attention. However, the truth is that these
types of incidents are relatively infrequent. It is the day-to-day incidents of computer
misuse that erode efficiency and damage reputations of both businesses and educational
institutions. Combating this misuse using countermeasures has been a common topic for
information security research, with many different authors proposing recommendations.
Countermeasures can be divided into two overall categories: technical and
administrative. Most authors recommend a balanced security plan with countermeasures
taken from both categories (Dhillon & Moores , 2001; Straub, 1990; Willison &
Backhouse, 2006). These recommendations, however, were for the business environment.
Higher education institutions have remained a relatively unstudied group. Further, many
studies favor one category of countermeasure over another instead of offering a blend of
both categories.
Examining computer security literature from a theoretical perspective reveals
three theories that have captured the attention of researchers: General Deterrence Theory,
Rational Choice Theory, and Situational Crime Prevention Theory. This researcher chose
Situational Crime Prevention Theory as a basis for study, due to its flexible, balanced
framework that can be readily applied to computer security.
Situational Crime Prevention has proven successful in reducing crime in many
types of situations including aircraft hijackings, post office robberies, and bank robberies
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(Clarke, 1997; Ekblom, 1988; Gabor, 1990; Grandjean, 1990; Wilkinson, 1986).
However, its efficacy in the area of computer security has yet to be studied empirically in
either the business sector or higher education sector. Therefore, this researcher
endeavored to study the relationship between categories of countermeasures in
Situational Crime Prevention Theory and the number of reported insider computer misuse
incidents on college campuses. It was posited that the data collected would assist higher
education administrators to create an effective security plan.
Data were collected with a web-based, anonymous questionnaire. The
questionnaire contained questions related to institution size, the number of computer
misuse incidents known in the year 2009, and countermeasures in place on each campus.
Participants were the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) or administrators of equivalent
responsibility at public, four-year institutions of higher education. After a pilot study was
completed to test the survey instrument, this researcher requested the participation of 442
higher education institutions, with a final, usable response count of 89.
Analysis of Research Findings
For hypotheses one through four, analysis using PLS-Graph produced the
following results. Using t statistic and critical value analysis, H1 and H2 were not
rejected, while H3 and H4 were rejected. Out of the four independent variables of
Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and
Remove Excuses, Decrease Anticipated Rewards appeared to exert the greatest negative
influence on the dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents. Further,
regression analysis using computed R2 value showed that 26% of the variance in
computer misuse incidents is explained by the current model.
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The respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness
were, in order, ID and password authentication, external firewalls, employee use of
strong passwords, virus scanning, and user training related to security policy.
Discussion of Research Findings
As of this writing, no researcher has reported data analysis on computer security
with Situational Crime Prevention Theory as a foundation. Therefore, it is not possible to
compare data results with any previous research. The reasons for this lack of data are not
clear. However, some authors have asserted that research in the area of information
security is particularly difficult due to the intrusive nature of the research and the general
mistrust of anyone seeking to gain information about information security (Kotulic &
Clark, 2004).
While the current research found a relationship between two of the independent
variables and the dependent variable of Incidents of Computer Misuse, only one of those
independent variables, the construct Decrease Anticipated Rewards, showed a negative
relationship. The relationship between the construct Remove Excuses and the number of
computer misuse incidents was positive, indicating that increasing the number of
countermeasures within the category of Remove Excuses would actually increase the
number of computer misuse incidents. This finding is counterintuitive. However,
Harrington (1996) found that a Code of Ethics, a countermeasure found in the Remove
Excuses category, has no effect on a user’s intention to commit misuse. Though intention
to commit misuse is not identical to actual incidents of misuse, it is reasonable to assume
that the intention to commit misuse precedes an incident of computer misuse.
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With one study finding a positive relationship between controls that would be
within the category of Remove Excuses and computer misuse, and another study finding
no relationship, it is possible that these types of countermeasures should not be
considered of upmost importance when creating a security plan.
Putting aside the overall lack of empirical data for comparison, it is interesting to
examine the list of countermeasures on the questionnaire through the lens of computer
security literature. The researcher compiled the list of countermeasures on the
questionnaire using information gathered from the body of research related to computer
security. The technical countermeasures were compiled using the research literature
outlined in Table 2, while the administrative countermeasures were compiled using the
research literature outlined in Table 3. Technical countermeasures tend to rely on some
type of technology while administrative countermeasures rely more on policies.
Though some of the recommended countermeasures appear in literature that is
more than five years old, respondents to the current researcher’s questionnaire indicated
that these countermeasures were in use on their campuses. This finding presents an
interesting conclusion. While the purpose of the current research was not to investigate
new trends in computer and information security, it would appear that many of the
countermeasures in place at colleges and universities represent old technologies. The top
five countermeasures in place are ID and password authentication, external firewalls,
strong password policies, virus scanning, and user training, technologies that have been
commonly used for a number of years. Perhaps it is feasible to consider the idea that the
field of computer security in higher education is in need of newer ideas and technology.
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Beebe and Rao (2005) discussed the imbalance of common computer security
countermeasures as found in Table 1. They found that 79% of commonly utilized
countermeasures affected the perceived cost/risk of the crime, while only 16.3% of the
countermeasures affect the perceived benefit of the crime, and only 4.7% removed the
criminal’s excuses for possibly committing the crime. Using data from Table 18 of the
present study, it is interesting to note the categories of countermeasures that are not
widely utilized in higher education. Countermeasures that are related to surveillance and
monitoring are not widely used. For example, only seven of 89 institutions reported that
they monitored employees’ email, and only three of 89 institutions reported that they
monitored employees’ web usage. Despite literature related to inappropriate use of email
(Fortiva, 2005), higher education institutions appear to be reluctant to use monitoring as a
countermeasure. This is most likely due to the culture of higher education, balancing
academic freedom with the need for control of technology. While higher education
professors demand a certain amount of autonomy in terms of technology, campus
technology security professionals must continue to exert control over classroom
computers and other technology resources. Therefore, there is a constant struggle
between a computer security specialist’s need to implement a strong security plan and
academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration (Oblinger, 2003).
In terms of this study, countermeasures related to surveillance and monitoring
would fall under the construct of Increase Perceived Effort. Though the null hypothesis
was not rejected, the t statistic was 1.621, just under the critical value of 1.662. This
relationship warrants further study. Perhaps refinement of the survey instrument would
uncover a relationship with the proper associated significance.
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Discussion of the categories of countermeasures would not be complete without
addressing the rapid pace of change within technology. A countermeasure that is
considered current at the time of this study may be outdated within a year or two. Readers
of the overall findings of this study need to be cognizant of the passage of time and its
relationship to technology.
Conclusions
The most obvious conclusion from this study could be that the lack of strong
predictive findings for each category of Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived
Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and Remove Excuses suggests that Situational
Crime Prevention Theory is not an ideal model for combating insider computer misuse on
college campuses. However, it cannot be ignored that this particular study is exploratory
in nature. Further, the respondents’ inconsistent nature of reported incidents of insider
computer misuse, as noted by the number of outliers in the data, complicated the
correlational data analysis for this particular study. With this in mind, the current
researcher is reluctant to dismiss Situational Crime Prevention Theory as an ineffective
model within the study of insider computer misuse. It is possible, however, that the
manner in which the data were collected and analyzed could be improved upon.
One of the most significant conclusions from the current study is the apparent
lack of knowledge related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on each
campus. The variability of the number of reported incidents combined with those who
responded with a “don’t know” to that particular question gives the impression that CIO’s
are making security decisions based on incomplete or incorrect data. Though the CIO’s
could simply be reluctant to share that particular piece of data, it is not likely that a
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respondent would be willing to share information about the countermeasures in place at
their campus by answering that part of the survey and then not be willing to share
information about the number of computer misuse incidents. This area warrants further
study.
From a security plan standpoint, this research provides some insight on the
categories of countermeasures that exert an influence on reported incidents of computer
security. A relationship exists between countermeasures that fall under the categories of
Decrease Anticipated Rewards and Remove Excuses and the reported incidents of
computer misuse, noting a positive relationship with Remove Excuses and a negative
relationship with Decrease Anticipated Rewards. In light of Beebe and Rao’s (2005)
finding that only 16.3% of commonly utilized countermeasures would fall under the
category of Decrease Anticipated Rewards, it would appear that security plans could be
enhanced by the addition of countermeasures within this category.
Finally, it would appear from the data as a whole that colleges and universities are
utilizing the most common countermeasures found in the literature. Additionally, the
pilot study group was specifically asked if they utilized any countermeasures that were
not listed on the questionnaire and none indicated an omission. With the assumption that
the list of countermeasures on the questionnaire was complete, the glaring lack of
monitoring utilization on campuses is important. Because of its innate culture, it could be
that what necessarily works and is acceptable in the business world is not necessarily
appropriate or acceptable in higher education. There is more study needed in this area.
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Implications
Higher education administrators are taxed with creating efficient computer
security plans that guard their electronic data and computer resources against misuse.
Therefore, the data contained in this study can provide a benchmark for CIO’s within
higher education institutions to compare their countermeasures with those of other
institutions. To date, most studies related to computer security have been conducted in
the field of business and not within higher education. With access to a body of data
related to computer security research within the field of higher education, administrators
can create effective policies regarding computer security that more efficiently utilize
ever-shrinking budgets.
Recommendations
Based on the experience gained during this research study, the current researcher
makes four recommendations.
1. As this is an exploratory study, a future researcher may choose to alter the
instrument or methodology in a way that makes correlational comparisons more
feasible. Instead of asking respondents about the number of insider computer
misuse incidents their campus has experienced, a series of questions about the
effectiveness of groups of countermeasures may prove more fruitful for analysis.
Additionally, utilizing the categories of computer misuse incidents in the
instrument rather than asking for an exact number of incidents may improve the
quality of the reported data.
2. A higher response rate would be ideal in a future study.
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3. As factor analysis revealed construct loadings that were comparably low, a future
study should revisit the categorization of countermeasures in order to build a
stronger instrument.
4. Though the pilot study respondents did not indicate any omissions in the list of
countermeasures on the current questionnaire, it might prove interesting to collect
qualitative data that specifically asks the population if they utilize any other or
newer technologies that are not present on the current questionnaire to combat
computer misuse on their campus.
Dissemination
The data in this research study is valuable to a number of audiences within higher
education. First, Educause was the first organization to complete a similar study of
information technology security in higher education. Therefore, this subject matter would
be of interest at one of their conferences. Second, the peer-reviewed Journal of Higher
Education Policy and Management might provide an appropriate avenue for the
dissemination of these results. According to the journal’s aim and scope, their readership
includes those higher education administrators who have the responsibility of developing
policy. Third, the peer-reviewed Informing Science Journal of an Emerging
Transdiscipline would be an additional avenue for publication. Informing Science aims to
inform its readership about information systems through a lens of many different
disciplines, including education.
The researcher plans to submit the results of this study within the next 12 months.
After initial publication, the researcher plans to further refine the instrument and recollect data using the same CIO contact list. This would serve two purposes. First,
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refinement of the data instrument could yield stronger relationships and predictive value
within the model. Second, utilizing the same CIO contact list could alleviate the problem
of the researcher being viewed as an “outsider” gathering sensitive information security
information.
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Dear Dr. _____________:
Thank you so much for agreeing to participate in the pilot study for my dissertation at
Georgia Southern University
I am conducting research related to IT security in higher education and the questionnaire
asks questions related to certain computer security countermeasures and, therefore, clear
terminology is very important. My pilot study will consist of responses from eight
institutions within the University System. Your answers are completely anonymous as I ask
no identifying information.
In addition to the questions that you answer as part of the questionnaire, I ask that you send
me an email regarding any survey terms that you found confusing or that need more
clarification, and give an estimation of the time it took you to complete it. Because your
institution would be involved in the pilot study, I will not use your data in my final analysis.
Thank you again for your participation in the pilot study. Please do not hesitate to contact
me if you have any questions. My contact information is through Macon State College,
where I am also a faculty member in the School of Information Technology.
The link to the survey is: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5ZTMH2P
The password is: tdsbger94
Julie Santiago
Assistant Professor, School of Information Technology
Macon State College
100 College Station Drive
Macon GA 31206
(478) 471-2808
julie.santiago@maconstate.edu
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Dear Dr. ________________:
I am conducting research related to IT security in higher education as part of my doctoral
studies at Georgia Southern University. I am specifically surveying public, four-year
colleges and universities in the United States in order to learn more about the state of IT
security on campuses nationwide.
If you would like to participate in the study, please click the following link. <insert
SurveyMonkey link>. The survey is rather short and should only take about 10 minutes to
complete. Additionally, your responses are completely anonymous and it is not possible to
specifically identify your institution through the survey.
In exchange for your participation, I am willing to share my data with you upon request.
Though I cannot identify specific colleges or universities, I can categorize the data based on
institution size. Therefore, I can provide you with data related to colleges and universities
that are similar in size to your own. Please email me at the address below if you would like a
copy of this data.
Thank you again for your consideration. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have
any questions. My contact information is through Macon State College, where I am also a
School of Information Technology faculty member. You may also contact Dr. Teri A.
Melton, my research advisor at Georgia Southern University, at
tamelton@georgiasouthern.edu or 912-478-0510 if you have any questions.
Julie Santiago
Assistant Professor, Macon State College
School of Information Technology
100 College Station Drive
Macon GA 31206
(478) 471-2808
julie.santiago@maconstate.edu
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Raw Data
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Raw Data for Incidents and Increase Perceived Effort
Records 1 – 47
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Raw Data for Incidents and Increase Perceived Effort
Records 48 – 89
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Raw Data for Increase Perceived Risk
Records 1 – 47
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Raw Data for Increase Perceived Risk
Records 48 – 89

133

Raw Data for Decrease Anticipated Rewards
Records 1 – 47
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Raw Data for Decrease Anticipated Rewards
Records 48 – 89
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Raw Data for Remove Excuses
Records 1 – 47
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Raw Data for Remove Excuses
Records 48 – 89
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Appendix F
PLS-Graph Licensing Agreement
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PLS-Graph User’s Guide, Version 3.0, February, 2001 edition Wynne W. Chin (author)
Copyright Notice
©1993–2001. Soft Modeling Inc. All rights reserved worldwide. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated into
any language or computer language, in any form or any means, electronic, mechanical,
magnetic, optical, chemical, manual or otherwise without the express written permission of
Soft Modeling Inc.
SOFT MODELING SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT
The following constitutes the terms of the License Agreement between a single user (User)
of this software package, and the producer of the package, Soft Modeling, Inc. (called Soft
Modeling hereafter). By opening the package, you (the User) are agreeing to become bound
by the terms of this agreement.
If you do not agree to the terms of this agreement do not open the package, and contact the
Soft Modeling Customer Service Department at a local Soft Modeling office (or an
authorized Soft Modeling reseller) in order to obtain an authorization number for the return
of the package. This License Agreement pertains also to all third party software included in
or distributed with Soft Modeling products.
License
Unless explicitly stated on the program media (CD or disks), the enclosed software package
are sold to be used on one computer system by one user at a time. This License Agreement
explicitly excludes renting or loaning the package. Unless explicitly stated on the program
media, this License Agreement explicitly excludes the use of this package on multi-user
systems, networks, or any time-sharing systems. (Contact Soft Modeling concerning Multiuser License Programs.) The user is allowed to install the software package on a hard disk
and make a backup copy for archival purposes. However, the software will never be
installed on more than one hard disk at a time. The documentation accompanying this
software package (or any of its parts) shall not be copied or reproduced in any form.
Disclaimer of Warranty
Although producing error free software is obviously a goal of every software manufacturer,
it can never be guaranteed that a software program is actually free of errors. Business and
scientific application software is inherently complex (and it can be used with virtually
unlimited numbers of data and command settings, producing idiosyncratic operational
environments for the software); therefore, the User is cautioned to verify the results of his or
her work. This software package is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Soft
Modeling and distributors of Soft Modeling software products make no representation or
warranties with respect to the contents of this software package and specifically disclaim
any implied warranties or merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose.
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In no event shall Soft Modeling be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of the use
of, inability to use, or malfunctioning of this software package. Soft Modeling does not
warrant that this software package will meet the User's requirements or that the operation of
the software package will be uninterrupted or error free.
Limited Warranty
If within 30 days from the date when the software package was purchased (i.e., invoice
date), the program media (CD or disks) are found to be defective (i.e., they are found to be
unreadable by the properly aligned media drive of the computer system on which the
package is intended to run), Soft Modeling will replace the media free of charge. After 30
days, the User will be charged for the replacement a nominal disk replacement fee.
If within 30 days from the date when the software package was purchased (i.e., invoice
date), the software package was found by the User not capable of performing any of its main
(i.e., basic) functions described explicitly in promotional materials published by Soft
Modeling, Soft Modeling will provide the User with replacement media free of defects (or a
replacement component downloadable from the Soft Modeling WEB site), or if the
replacement cannot be provided within 90 days from the date when Soft Modeling was
notified by the User about the defect, the User will receive a refund of the purchasing price
of the software package.
Updates, Corrections, Improvements
The User has a right to purchase all subsequent updates, new releases, new versions, and
modifications of the software package introduced by Soft Modeling for an update fee or for
a reduced price (depending on the scope of the modification); however, purchasing an
update or upgrade (for a reduced price) constitutes a replacement of an existing license and
not acquisition of a new license.
Soft Modeling is not obligated to inform the User about new updates, improvements,
modifications, and/or corrections of errors introduced to its software packages. In no event
shall Soft Modeling be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of the failure to notify
the User about a known defect of the software package.
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Output results with Construct Level sign change preprocessing:
Bootstrap raw data generated for Julie Santiago
Number of cases in full model: 89
Number of cases per sample: 89
Number of samples generated: 200
Number of good samples: 200

Outer Model Weights:
===================================================================
=
Original
Mean of
Standard
T-Statistic
sample
subsamples error
estimate
Incident:
Incident
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
IPE

IPR

:
TH1
TH3
AC1
DO1
DO2
CF1

0.2392
0.4385
0.3821
0.0824
0.1629
0.2343

0.2088
0.3473
0.3178
0.0654
0.1293
0.1842

0.3046
0.2277
0.2144
0.2327
0.2102
0.1884

0.7852
1.9256
1.7819
0.3541
0.7751
1.2434

:
EES1
EES2
FS1
NS2

0.5342
0.2439
0.3243
0.4111

0.4627
0.2359
0.2790
0.3830

0.2299
0.2389
0.2189
0.2482

2.3232
1.0211
1.4818
1.6564

0.1870
0.4948
0.3003
0.0940
0.3446
0.3850

0.1623
0.3966
0.2359
0.0206
0.2938
0.3794

0.2277
0.1797
0.2730
0.2698
0.1615
0.1941

0.8211
2.7532
1.1001
0.3484
2.1340
1.9835

0.0901
0.5920
0.1388
-0.3554
0.4298

0.0891
0.4807
0.1197
-0.2859
0.3517

0.2151
0.2168
0.2304
0.2546
0.2227

0.4190
2.7310
0.6024
1.3960
1.9298

DAR

:
TR1
TR3
RT2
RT3
DB1
DB2

RE

:
SC1
CD1
CD2
CD3
FC1
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FC2
0.1440
0.1137
0.2031
0.7089
=================================================================
Outer Model Loadings:
=================================================================
Original
Mean of
Standard
T-Statistic
sample
subsamples error
estimate
Incident:
(Composite Reliability =
1.000 , AVE =
1.000 )
Incident
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
IPE
:
(Composite Reliability =
TH1
0.3629
TH3
0.8153
AC1
0.7811
DO1
0.5518
DO2
0.4012
CF1
0.6250

0.770 , AVE =
0.377 )
0.3255
0.3318
1.0938
0.6703
0.2669
3.0552
0.6534
0.2572
3.0369
0.4518
0.2864
1.9266
0.3156
0.2680
1.4970
0.5113
0.2414
2.5890

IPR
:
(Composite Reliability =
EES1
0.7129
EES2
0.5729
FS1
0.6427
NS2
0.6591

0.743 , AVE =
0.421 )
0.6223
0.2612
2.7291
0.5342
0.2195
2.6096
0.5700
0.2295
2.8008
0.6098
0.2058
3.2020

DAR
:
(Composite Reliability =
TR1
0.3780
TR3
0.6803
RT2
0.5284
RT3
0.4837
DB1
0.5433
DB2
0.5230

0.695 , AVE =
0.281 )
0.3327
0.2601
1.4535
0.5601
0.2348
2.8978
0.4472
0.2737
1.9304
0.3608
0.2949
1.6404
0.4320
0.2421
2.2437
0.5021
0.1925
2.7168

RE
:
(Composite Reliability =
0.679 , AVE =
0.277 )
SC1
0.4847
0.4254
0.2605
1.8604
CD1
0.7529
0.6430
0.2134
3.5275
CD2
0.3574
0.3048
0.2913
1.2269
CD3
-0.3378
-0.2846
0.2752
1.2273
FC1
0.6412
0.5416
0.2305
2.7819
FC2
0.4537
0.3867
0.2585
1.7549
================================================================

Path Coefficients Table (Original Sample Estimate):
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================================================================
Incident
IPE
IPR
DAR
RE
Incident 0.0000
-0.1210
-0.1930
-0.2030
0.3920
IPE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
IPR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
DAR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
RE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
=================================================================
Path Coefficients Table (Mean of Subsamples):
=================================================================
Incident
IPE
IPR
DAR
RE
Incident
0.0000
-0.1787
-0.1678
-0.2037
0.3680
IPE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
IPR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
DAR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
RE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
=================================================================
Path Coefficients Table (Standard Error):
=================================================================
Incident
IPE
IPR
DAR
RE
Incident
0.0000
0.1187
0.1191
0.1058
0.1453
IPE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
IPR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
DAR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
RE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
=================================================================
Path Coefficients Table (T-Statistic)
================================================================
Incident
IPE
IPR
DAR
RE
Incident 0.0000
1.0190
1.6208
1.9191
2.6970
IPE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
IPR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
DAR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
RE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
================================================================
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P

L

S

G R A P H
for
Partial Least Squares Analysis
(2004 Feb 27)
YEAR-MONTH-DAY: 2010-10-31
HOUR:MIN:SECS: 19:39:23.
0

(HOWDY PARDNER!! HOW Y'ALL DOING, EH?)
600000 = Available Field Length.
600000 = Requested Field Length.

0CPU-Time =
Total =

0 min
0 min

0.00 sec
0.00 sec

0

Comments..
COMM
PLS Deck generated for Julie Santiago
0JBL
1.8
====================================
0-P
L
S
X
-0-- LATENT VARIABLES PATH ANALYSIS -- PARTIAL LEAST-SQUARES ESTIMATION 0
0====================================
0Number of Blocks
NBLOCS =
5
Number of Cases
NCASES =
89
Number of Dimensions
NDIM =
1
0Output Quantity
OUT = 2255
Inner Weighting Scheme IWGHT =
1
Number of Iterations
NITER = 100
Estimation Accuracy
EPS =
5
Analysed Data Metric
METRIC =
1
0====================================
Block
N-MV Deflate LV-Mode
Model
-----------------------------------Incident
1
yes
outward Endogen
IPE
6
yes
outward Exogen
IPR
4
yes
outward Exogen
DAR
6
yes
outward Exogen
RE
6
yes
outward Exogen
-----------------------------------23
.
====================================
0Real words needed
3803 from 600000
0Char words needed
235 from 40000
1
0Dimension No. 1
0Partial Least-Squares Parameter Estimation
0Change of Stop Criteria during Iteration
0Cycle No.
CR1
CR2
CR3
1 0.1355E+01 0.3912E-01 0.3558E+00
2 0.5551E-15 0.1276E-01 0.1110E-15
0Convergence at Iteration Cycle No.
2

CR4

CR5

0.3290E+00
0.1110E-15

0.5296E+00
0.2220E-15
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0B .. Path coefficients
============================================================
Incident IPE
IPR
DAR
RE
-----------------------------------------------------------Incident
0.000
-0.121
-0.193
-0.203
0.392
IPE
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
IPR
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
DAR
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
RE
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
============================================================
0R .. Correlations of latent variables
============================================================
Incident IPE
IPR
DAR
RE
-----------------------------------------------------------Incident
1.000
IPE
-0.244
1.000
IPR
-0.299
0.520
1.000
DAR
-0.286
0.544
0.516
1.000
RE
0.292
0.223
0.156
0.211
1.000
============================================================
0Inner Model
======================================================================
Block
Mean Location Mult.RSq AvResVar AvCommun AvRedund
---------------------------------------------------------------------Incident
0.0000
0.0000
0.2594
0.0000
1.0000
0.2594
IPE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.6229
0.3771
0.0000
IPR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.5790
0.4210
0.0000
DAR
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.7187
0.2813
0.0000
RE
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.7232
0.2768
0.0000
---------------------------------------------------------------------Average
0.0519
0.6394
0.3606
0.0113
======================================================================
0Outer Model
======================================================================
Variable
Weight
Loading Location ResidVar Communal Redundan
---------------------------------------------------------------------Incident outward
Incident
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.2594
---------------------------------------------------------------------IPE
outward
TH1
0.2392
0.3629
0.0000
0.8683
0.1317
0.0000
TH3
0.4385
0.8153
0.0000
0.3353
0.6647
0.0000
AC1
0.3821
0.7811
0.0000
0.3899
0.6101
0.0000
DO1
0.0824
0.5518
0.0000
0.6955
0.3045
0.0000
DO2
0.1629
0.4012
0.0000
0.8391
0.1609
0.0000
CF1
0.2343
0.6250
0.0000
0.6094
0.3906
0.0000
---------------------------------------------------------------------IPR
outward
EES1
0.5342
0.7129
0.0000
0.4917
0.5083
0.0000
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EES2
0.2439
0.5729
0.0000
0.6718
0.3282
0.0000
FS1
0.3243
0.6427
0.0000
0.5869
0.4131
0.0000
NS2
0.4111
0.6591
0.0000
0.5656
0.4344
0.0000
---------------------------------------------------------------------DAR
outward
TR1
0.1870
0.3780
0.0000
0.8571
0.1429
0.0000
TR3
0.4948
0.6803
0.0000
0.5372
0.4628
0.0000
RT2
0.3003
0.5284
0.0000
0.7208
0.2792
0.0000
RT3
0.0940
0.4837
0.0000
0.7660
0.2340
0.0000
DB1
0.3446
0.5433
0.0000
0.7048
0.2952
0.0000
DB2
0.3850
0.5230
0.0000
0.7265
0.2735
0.0000
---------------------------------------------------------------------RE
outward
SC1
0.0901
0.4847
0.0000
0.7651
0.2349
0.0000
CD1
0.5920
0.7529
0.0000
0.4331
0.5669
0.0000
CD2
0.1388
0.3574
0.0000
0.8723
0.1277
0.0000
CD3
-0.3554
-0.3378
0.0000
0.8859
0.1141
0.0000
FC1
0.4298
0.6412
0.0000
0.5888
0.4112
0.0000
FC2
0.1440
0.4537
0.0000
0.7941
0.2059
0.0000
======================================================================
0Theta .. Outer residual covariance
==========================================================================
Incident TH1
TH3
AC1
DO1
DO2
CF1
------------------------------------------------------------------------Incident0.000
TH1
0.000
0.868
TH3
0.000
-0.210
0.335
AC1
0.000
-0.175
-0.080
0.390
DO1
0.000
-0.141
-0.044
-0.047
0.696
DO2
0.000
0.013
-0.099
-0.270
-0.127
0.839
CF1
0.000
-0.168
-0.198
-0.104
0.146
0.073
0.609
EES1
0.000
-0.037
-0.044
0.188
-0.104
-0.158
-0.040
EES2
0.000
-0.058
0.084
-0.078
0.131
-0.044
0.013
FS1
0.000
0.032
-0.008
-0.169
0.099
0.152
0.118
NS2
0.000
0.057
0.014
-0.065
-0.021
0.111
-0.048
TR1
0.000
0.001
0.003
-0.067
0.016
0.055
0.059
TR3
0.000
-0.122
0.064
0.142
-0.080
-0.115
-0.120
RT2
0.000
0.104
-0.136
-0.037
0.094
0.069
0.128
RT3
0.000
0.103
0.015
-0.024
0.078
-0.083
-0.065
DB1
0.000
-0.014
-0.029
-0.016
-0.071
0.058
0.080
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DB2 0.000
0.062
0.045
-0.101
0.065
0.036
-0.031
SC1 0.000
0.054
-0.095
-0.095
0.061
0.194
0.122
CD1 0.000
0.070
0.016
-0.002
-0.030
-0.029
-0.068
CD2 0.000
0.043
-0.085
0.009
0.007
-0.021
0.111
CD3 0.000
0.042
0.029
-0.035
0.006
-0.032
-0.021
FC1 0.000
-0.131
0.059
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.022
FC2 0.000
0.131
-0.030
-0.026
0.091
-0.068
-0.019
Inc 0.000
-0.032
-0.022
-0.002
0.093
0.016
0.034
IPE 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
IPR 0.000
-0.049
-0.039
0.170
0.085
-0.163
-0.070
DAR 0.000
-0.081
-0.036
0.135
-0.041
-0.034
-0.032
RE
0.000
-0.109
0.040
-0.032
0.075
0.062
0.018
======================================================================
0Theta .. Outer residual covariance
=======================================================================
EES1
EES2
FS1
NS2
TR1
TR3
RT2
---------------------------------------------------------------------EES1
0.492
EES2
0.159
0.672
FS1
0.228
-0.163
0.587
NS2
-0.364
-0.063
-0.069
0.566
TR1
-0.179
0.102
0.118
0.080
0.857
TR3
0.187
-0.026
-0.079
-0.166
-0.181
0.537
RT2
-0.094
0.008
0.031
0.093
0.007
-0.216
0.721
RT3
-0.055
-0.070
0.016
0.100
-0.057
-0.001
-0.107
DB1
0.105
-0.044
-0.027
-0.089
-0.192
-0.108
-0.203
DB2
-0.161
0.034
0.040
0.157
-0.003
-0.337
-0.081
SC1
-0.134
0.034
0.197
-0.002
0.084
-0.191
0.098
CD1
-0.063
0.016
0.015
0.061
-0.021
-0.073
0.036
CD2
-0.071
-0.125
0.112
0.078
-0.023
-0.014
-0.001
CD3
-0.083
-0.018
0.088
0.049
0.062
-0.194
0.055
FC1
0.074
-0.020
-0.032
-0.059
0.036
-0.005
-0.013
FC2
-0.014
0.047
0.022
-0.027
0.100
-0.031
-0.033
Incident -0.045
0.053
0.036
-0.001
0.025
-0.025
0.018
IPE
0.273
-0.109
-0.068
-0.236
-0.045
0.091
0.041
IPR
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.033
-0.072
0.085
DAR
0.143
-0.087
-0.075
-0.075
0.000
0.000
0.000
RE
-0.019
-0.014
0.012
0.023
0.248
0.010
-0.061
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===================================================================
0Theta .. Outer residual covariance
===========================================================================
RT3
DB1
DB2
SC1
CD1
CD2
CD3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------RT3
0.766
DB1
-0.010
0.705
DB2
-0.065
-0.238
0.726
SC1
0.014
0.131
0.008
0.765
CD1
0.032
-0.006
0.074
0.044
0.433
CD2
0.020
0.030
-0.001
0.041
-0.020
0.872
CD3
-0.071
-0.012
0.205
0.263
0.306
0.149
0.886
FC1
-0.092
-0.031
0.049
-0.048
-0.307
-0.141
0.145
FC2
-0.061
-0.021
0.050
0.095
-0.117
0.007
0.188
Incident 0.097
0.003
-0.021
-0.104
0.024
-0.047
-0.048
IPE
-0.111
0.052
-0.146
0.230
-0.011
0.008
0.176
IPR
0.071
0.062
-0.061
0.300
0.102
0.129
0.222
DAR
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.199
0.038
0.105
0.283
RE
0.102
-0.003
-0.108
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
===========================================================================
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0Theta

.. Outer residual covariance

=======================================================================
====
FC1
FC2
Incident IPE
IPR
DAR
RE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------FC1
0.589
FC2
0.029
0.794
Incident -0.010
-0.073
1.000
IPE
0.065
0.134
-0.244
1.000
IPR
-0.102
0.124
-0.299
0.520
1.000
DAR
0.047
0.178
-0.286
0.544
0.516
1.000
RE
0.000
0.000
0.292
0.223
0.156
0.211
1.000
=======================================================================
===0
==PLSW no prob, eh?
0CPU-Time =
0 min 0.01 sec
Total =
0 min 0.01 sec
0
No errors reported.

